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The Founders' Unwritten Constitution
Suzanna Sherryt
In seeking to understand and interpret our written Constitution, judges and scholars have often focused on two related issues:
how did the founding generation understand the Constitution they
created, and to what extent should that understanding be relevant
to modern constitutional interpretation? This article will address
the first of these questions, but in a manner that profoundly affects the second question as well. I will suggest that the founding
generation did not intend their new Constitution to be the sole
source of paramount or higher law, but instead envisioned multiple
sources of fundamental law. The framers thus intended courts to
look outside the Constitution in determining the validity of certain
governmental actions, specifically those affecting the fundamental
rights of individuals. Like Jefferson Powell's recent scholarship
suggesting that those who met in Philadelphia intended their own
subjective intent to be irrelevant to later interpretation,' my conclusion makes clear that the framers intended something independent of their own intent to serve as a source of constitutional law.
In order to determine the role that the written Constitution
played in the founders' vision of fundamental or higher law,. I will
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1976, Middlebury College;
J.D. 1979, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Daniel A. Farber, Philip P. Frickey,
and H. Jefferson Powell for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv.L.Rev.
885 (1985).
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focus primarily on their view of judicial review. Prior scholarship
in this area has addressed largely the question of whether those
who wrote and ratified the Constitution expected judges to review
statutes and invalidate those inconsistent with the written Constitution.2 That limited focus, while valuable-and a necessary precursor to this article-answers only the limited question of the extent to which the founding generation viewed the written
Constitution as one source of higher law. I will address a somewhat
different question: the extent to which the founding generation
viewed the Constitution as the only source of higher law.
I will suggest in Part I that the traditions inherited from both
English opposition theory and post-Revolutionary American practice held a written constitution to be only one aspect of the fundamental or higher law that might serve to invalidate legislative enactments. Then in Part II, I will show how the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 reflected changing notions of the very nature
of a written constitution, crystallizing and clarifying the justification for its status as higher law by defining it as a sui generis species of law: popularly enacted fundamental law. I will suggest in
Part III, however, that despite these changes in the framers' vision
of the nature of a written constitution, they never intended to displace the prior tradition of multiple sources of fundamental law.
The summer in Philadelphia yielded a new view only of the nature,
and not of the relative authority, of a written constitution.
I.

INHERITED TRADITIONS

When fifty-five men met in Philadelphia in May of 1787 to
write a constitution, their efforts inevitably reflected their political
heritage. They were all well and widely read, and many were educated in the law. By 1787, they could draw on a rich tradition of
English and American notions of fundamental or higher law and
the courts' role in applying such law. This section will first examine eighteenth century English and American theories of fundamental law, and then turn to how the newly independent states
implemented these theories in practice.
A. The Nature of Fundamental Law
The spirit of the English tradition of constitutionalism was
2

See, e.g., citations collected by George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, History

of the Supreme Court of The United States: Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-15
at 182 n.2 (1981).
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best exemplified for the Americans in the theories of Coke and
Bolingbroke. These theories rested on three distinct premises: first,
that some form of higher law-the British constitution-existed
and operated to make void Acts of Parliament inconsistent with
that fundamental law; second, that this fundamental law, or constitution, consisted of a mixture of custom, natural law, religious
law, enacted law, and reason; and third, that judges might use that
fundamental law to pronounce void inconsistent legislative or royal
enactments. These ideas were those of the opposition party in England, and thus were never accepted by those who held power in
that country. They were, however, tremendously influential upon
the generation that framed the American constitution.'
The first and third premises translate easily into a written
constitution enforceable by means of judicial review, and thus are
familiar enough to need little further explication. The idea of a
form of law superior to royal or parliamentary enactments began
as a defense against royal invasion of cherished privileges. By the
seventeenth century, appeal to "the ancient constitution," which
had existed since "time immemorial," was a standard political argument against royal or parliamentary invasions of rights.4 The
colonies relied heavily on this English opposition rhetoric in their
fight for independence, and the new states translated it into action
with early instances of judicial invalidation of legislative acts. 5 It is
thus unsurprising that in 1787 the men in Philadelphia could uniformly assume that the federal courts would exercise the power of
judicial review, although a few disapproved of the practice.

' See generally Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (1978); Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 89-95 (1971); James Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law
48-53 (1895); Thomas C. Grey, The Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental
Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 Stan.L.Rev. 843, 849-50 (1978). For the quintessential English rejection, see City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod.Rep. 669, 678 (1701)("an
act of parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd...
An act of parliament may not make adultery lawful, that is, it cannot make it lawful for A.
to lie with the wife of B. but it may make the wife of A. to be the wife of B. and dissolve her
marriage with A.").
4 J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English
Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century 16-18, 46 (1957). Pocock regards the appeal
to the "ancient constitution" as an appeal to custom, not to immutable abstract political
principles. See also Grey, 30 Stan.L.Rev. at 850-54 (cited in note 3).
5 See generally Goebel, History at 50-142 (cited in note 3); Gary J. Jacobsohn, The
Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration 82-83 (1986); Grey, 30
Stan.L.Rev. at 881-82 (cited in note 3).
' See James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 61, 336-43,
462-65 (Adrienne Koch ed. 1966) ("Madison's Notes").
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A much less familiar ingredient in the English opposition ideology is the nature of the constitution or fundamental law. Neither
a single written document nor a category of either natural or enacted law, the ancient constitution was an amorphous admixture of
various sources of law. It was essentially custom mediated by reason.7 Bolingbroke defined it as "that Assemblage of Laws, Institutions and Customs, derived from certain fix'd Principles of Reason,
directed to certain fix'd Objects of publick Good, that compose the
general System, according to which the Community hath agreed to
be govern'd."' Coke described as void any Act of Parliament that
is "against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible
to be performed." Rutherforth, another English influence on the
colonists, 10 held that "there does not seem to be any way of determining what form has been established in any particular nation,
but by acquainting ourselves with the history and the customs of
that nation. A knowledge of its present customs will inform us
what constitution of government obtains now."'" A constitution
was simply the norms by which a people were constituted into a
nation. Thus in the 1760s, an American revolutionary thinker
could refer to "the constitution of things" and "the British constitution" with a clear relatedness of meaning. 2 This natural law tradition was also echoed in the thought of various continental influ3
ences on the Americans."
For a general description of this form of English constitutionalism, see J. W. Gough,
Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (1961); 0. Hood Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law (5th ed. 1973).
8 Henry St. John Viscount Bolingbroke, A Dissertation Upon Parties (3d ed. 1735),
quoted in Goebel, History at 89 (cited in note 3).
9 Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 107, 118a (1610), quoted in Goebel, History at 92
(cited in note 3); see also James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in The Political
Works of James Harrington 171 (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1977)(referring to "common right, law of

nature, or interest of the whole" as animating a republic). Corwin makes clear that in referring to "common right and reason," Coke was referring to some form of higher, fundamental

law. Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law Background" of American Constitutional Law, 42
Harv.L.Rev. 149, 365, 368-73 (1928).
10 Grey,
'1

30 Stan.L.Rev. at 860-61 (cited in note 3).

Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law 95 (1756). See also Pocock, Ancient

Constitution at 173 (describing the thought of Sir Matthew Hale, Chief Justice of the King's
Bench: "To know English law, then, there is no other way but to learn what the English

have at various times decided shall be law") (cited in note 4).
12 Daniel Shute, An Election Sermon (1768), in Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S.
Lutz, eds., 1 American Political Writing During the Founding Era, 1760-1805 109, 116, 117,
128 (1983).
13

See generally Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts 50-57

(1930); Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., American Interpretations of Natural Law: A Study in
the History of Political Thought 1-123 (1931) (English conception of natural law); Daniel A.

Farber and John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1
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Creating fundamental law thus did not require a single, extraordinary, extra-legislative act of the people.1" Fundamental law
could be reflected in ordinary legislative enactments. Indeed, early
American revolutionaries stressed that acquiescence to abhorrent
Parliamentary actions was dangerous precisely because it
threatened to ratify such actions as consistent with or part of fundamental law. 15 After the mid-1760s, this legislative strand of fundamental law began to lose importance as the implications of the
superiority of fundamental law over legislative enactments were
worked out. 6 The transition, however, was not complete by 1787.
Nine of the eleven state constitutions adopted between 1776 and
1778 were enacted by ordinary legislative means, and the other two
were drafted by specially elected conventions and implemented
without popular ratification. 1 Of the five of these early constitutions that made any provision for amendments, three provided for
amendment by the legislature. 8 Only two state constitutions
adopted prior to the Federal Constitutional Convention in
1787-those of Massachusetts in 1780 and New Hampshire in
1784-were ratified by the people.' 9 The idea that fundamental
law, in order to be fundamental, needed the approbation of more
Const.Comm. 235, 242-45 (1984); Grey, 30 Stan.L.Rev. 862-3 (cited in note 3); Walter F.
Murphy, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing, in M. Judd Harmon, ed., Essays on the Constitution of the United States 130, 139-140 (1978).
1 As Thomas Grey recognizes, an enacted constitution was still a novel idea by 1760.

Grey, 30 Stan.L.Rev. at 864 (cited in note 3).
"

See id. at 878-79. Grey interprets the danger inherent in acquiescence as a possibility

that "the claim of illegality [would be] waived." But the idea of waiver does not adequately
capture the problem described in the passages from John Dickinson quoted by Grey. Dickinson worried not that the claim would be waived, but rather that the practice of acquiescence would create a "detestable precedent" unfavorable to the merits of the claim. Id.,
quoting Paul L. Ford, ed., 1 The Writings of John Dickinson 202 (1895).
'6 See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 180-84
(1967).
'7 See Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and

the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era at 63-86 (1980); R.R.
Palmer, The American Revolution: The People as Constituent Power, in Jack P. Greene,

ed., The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution 1763-1789 342-43 (1979).
18 See Francis Newton Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters,
and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming

the United States of America 568 (Del.Const. of 1776 art. 30), 1701 (Md.Const. of 1776 art.
LIX), 3257 (S.C.Const. of 1778 art. XLIV) (1909). The Constitutions of Georgia and Pennsylvania required the calling of conventions for amendments. See id. at 785 (Ga.Const. of
1777 art. LXIII), 3091-92 (Pa.Const. of 1776 § 47) (1909).
'9 Adams, First American Constitutions at 68-70, 86-93 (cited in note 17); Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 149 (1985).

Both these constitutions also required conventions for amendments. See Thorpe, Federal
and State Constitutions at 1911 (Mass.Const. of 1780 ch. VI, art. X), 2470 (N.H.Const. of
1784)(cited in note 18).
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than the elected legislature was thus still open to debate in 1787.20
The idea that certain fundamental rights could not be ceded
away also colored the American view of fundamental law.21 Fundamental rights were God-given, and were rights "which no creature
can give, or hath a right to take away."22 They were, in the language of the Declaration of Independence, "inalienable." Legislators could no more rewrite these laws of nature than they could the
laws of physics.2" The Cokean and continental notion of fundamental principles and the more Lockean idea of fundamental rights are
two sides of the same coin: 24 both were grounded on unwritten natural law. The difference between the two visions-which the early
Americans combined-2 5 --is largely that between republican communitarianism, which emphasizes the relations among members of the
community, and liberal individualism, which stresses rights adher26
ing to individual members of the polity.

If these rights were thought to be inherent, what, then, was a
legislature doing when it "enacted" enumerated and elaborate lists
of fundamental rights and principles? It was merely declaring
rights already in existence: the "Magna Charta,doth not give the
privileges therein mentioned, nor doth our Charters, but must be
considered as only declaratory of our rights, and in affirmance of
them.

'27

This separation of natural rights from positive law was

more than mere rhetoric. Seven state constitutions explicitly di20 See discussion of July 23 debates below. But see Gordon Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic 1776-1787 306 (1969)("Although the idea of a convention of the people
existing outside of the legislature was far more important than the concept of higher law in
-indicating the direction American political thought was taking in the years after Independence, the two ideas were inextricably linked, and developed in tandem.").
22 See generally Bailyn, Ideological Origins at 184-89 (cited in note 16).
22 Silas Downer, A Discourse at the Dedication of the Tree of Liberty (1768), in Hyneman and Lutz, 1 American Political Writing at 97, 100 (cited in note 12).
2 See Henry Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined and
America Realized the Enlightenment 234 (1977).
2, See Murphy, Art at 140 (cited in note 13).
2 One illustration of the pervasive influence of both schools of thought is Jefferson's
commentary: he noted both that Coke's work was "the universal elementary book of law
students, and a sounder Whig never wrote" and that Locke's work was "perfect as far as it
goes." Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), in Adrienne Koch and William
Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 726 (1944); Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Randolph, May 30, 1790, in id. at 497.
26 See generally, Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va.L.Rev. 543, 544-562 (1986).
27 Downer, Discourse at 100 (cited in note 12); see also Wood, Creation at 271, 293-96
(cited in note 20); Murphy, Art at 140 ("It was not the function of government to confer
such rights but to secure them.")(cited in note 13).
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vided a "Declaration of Rights" from a "Frame of Government," 28
suggesting that the former was declared and the latter enacted.
Only four states mingled provisions protecting individual rights
with provisions establishing a frame of government, and these protections were not as extensive as those contained in separate declarations of rights.29 Since no evidence exists that the drafters of
these four constitutions intended to cede the unlisted rights, their
failure to include them suggests that the vast majority of rights
were something apart from the frame of government.
Moreover, the language of the various declarations of
rights-from the English Bill of Rights of 1689 through the Declaration of Independence and the state Declarations of Rights of
1776-1778-indicates that the authors of those documents believed
that they were merely declaring existing, inalienable rights. The
Bill of Rights of 1689 "declared" the "true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties" of Englishmen. The Declaration of Independence "declared" "self-evident truths." Six state declarations
of rights or constitutions explicitly referred to "natural," "inherent," "essential," or "inalienable" rights.3 0 Another referred to "the
common rights of mankind."3' Three state constitutions specifically prohibited either amendment or violation of their declarations of rights.2
Fundamental law might evolve, but not to the extent of depriving citizens of natural rights. Legislative accretion might add
to, or interpret, these natural rights, but could not deny them altogether. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in 1775:

28

See Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions at 562 (Del.Const. of 1776), 1686 &

1691 (Md.Declaration of Rights & Const. of 1776), 1889 & 1893 (Mass.Declaration of Rights
& Const. of 1780), 2453 & 2458 (N.H.Declaration of Rights & Const. of 1784), 2787 & 2789
(N.C.Declaration of Rights & Const. of 1776), 3082 & 3084 (Pa.Declaration of Rights &
Const. of 1776), 3812 & 3814 (Va.Declaration of Rights & Const. of 1776) (cited in note 18);
Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 234 (Va.Declaration of
Rights of 1776), 276 (Del.Declaration of Rights of 1776)(1980).
29 Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions at 784-85 (Ga.Const. of 1777 arts. LVI,
LVIII-LXII), 2597-98 (N.J.Const. of 1776 arts. XVI-XIX), 2635, 2636-37 (N.Y.Const. of
1777 arts. XXXIV, XXXVIII-XLI), 3257 (S.C.Const. of 1778 arts. XL-XLIII) (cited in note

18).
3o See id. at 1889 (Mass.Declaration of Rights of 1780 art. I), 2453-54 (N.H.Declaration
of Rights of 1784 arts. I-IV), 2625-26 (N.Y.Const. of 1777 preamble, quoting Declaration of
Independence), 3082 (Pa.Const. of 1776 arts. 1-1l), 3813 (Va.Declaration of Rights of 1776 §
1); Schwartz, Bill of Rights at 277 (Del.Declaration of Rights of 1776 § 2)(cited in note 18).
31 See Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions at 777 (Ga.Const. of 1777 preamble)(cited in note 18).
32 Id. at 568 (Del.Const. of 1776 art. 30), 2794 (N.C.Const. of 1776 art. XLIV), 3091
(Pa.Const. of 1776 § 46).
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The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for,
among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as
with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the
hand of divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by
33
mortal power.

There was thus a complementary relationship between the more
inclusive body of fundamental law as the legal framework of the
community, and the inherent natural rights which formed 3an
inte4
gral and unalterable part of the broader fundamental law.
To this combination of evolving fundamental law and inalienable rights, the newly independent states added a third idea: the
constitution as a charter or form of government. Heavily influenced by the modern science of politics which envisioned a charter
of government as a compact between a people and its rulers, but
still clinging to the older tradition of fundamental law and inalienable rights, the new state constitutions reflected these three characteristics. The states declared natural rights, described with great
precision the structure of the state government, and then incorporated by reference British and colonial tradition and common
35

law.

B. Judicial Review
By the 1780s, then, the "constitution" of an American state
consisted of its fundamental law (both positive and natural), the
inherent and inalienable rights of man (whether declared or not),
and the recipe for a governmental mixture that would best protect
and preserve the fundamental law and natural rights. This theoretical, intellectual construction of a constitution, moreover, served as
the basis for the practical exercise of judicial review. Long before
" The Farmer Refuted &c., in Harold C. Syrett, ed., 1 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 81, 122 (1961).
" This parallels (although it may or may not be derived from) the division between
Coke and Hale in their respective developments of the idea of law as custom: Coke viewed it
as "fixed, unchanging, immemorial" while Hale saw it as continually adaptive. See J.G.A.
Pocock, Ancient Constitution at 173-74 (cited in note 4).
" See Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions at 566-67 (Del.Const. of 1776 art. 25),
1686-87 (Md.Const. of 1776 art. III), 1910 (Mass.Const. of 1780 ch. VI, art. VI), 2469
(N.H.Const. of 1784), 2598 (N.J.Const. of 1776 art. XXII), 2635-36 (N.Y.Const. of 1777 art.
XXXV)(cited in note 18). See generally Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, British Statutes in American Law 1776-1836 (1964). Brown concludes that some early state legislatures adopted British statutory and common law somewhat indiscriminately, leaving courts to work out the
detail of implementation. See id. at 23-33. Other states assumed a somewhat different tack,
the revise-and-repeal approach, in which the legislatures attempted to make explicit which
laws were or were not being adopted. See id. at 34-45.
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Marbury v. Madison, state courts were passing on the validity of
legislative enactments in light of some higher law. Because this
practice of judicial review was still in an embryonic stage before
1787, and instances of actual review of state laws were localized
and sporadic,3 6 it is possible to examine virtually all of the pre1787 cases in which a state court reviewed a state legislative enactment for consistency with fundamental law.
An examination of these earliest American instances of judicial review confirms the existence and character of the different
aspects of a "constitution" as well as the widespread recognition of
their diverse sources. With one exception, the only time the court
paid careful and exclusive attention to the language, structure and
meaning of the written constitution was where the question before
the court involved some question of separation of powers. Where
the allocation of power among parts of the government was not at
issue, the court instead referred almost indiscriminately to the constitution or charter, natural law, ancient custom, inalienable rights,
and so on. Thus the written constitution or charter served as the
sole source of fundamental law for determining the government's
internal structure, but not for describing its relationship to the
citizenry.
In five of the seven pre-1787 instances of judicial review of legislative enactments, 7 the opinions or pleadings or both exhibit
characteristic indifference to whether the fundamental law cited is

" See William Winslow Crosskey, 2 Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
United States 944-975 (1953); Goebel, History at 126-141 (cited in note 3); Grey, 30
Stan.L.Rev. at 881-82 (cited in note 3); Powell, 98 Harv.L.Rev. at 887 n.11 (cited in note 1).
Crosskey canvassed the literature in 1953 and found only nine alleged instances of judicial
review up to 1787, all of which he considers false precedents. I deal with all but two: a
Virginia case where the constitutionality of the statute (a bill of attainder) was not at issue,
because the statute was not yet operative when the criminal was apprehended and therefore
became unnecessary, and a Massachusetts case that apparently did not exist. See Crosskey,
2 Politics at 944-48, 961-62. While Crosskey's interpretation is open to question, his list of
cases has not been improved upon. The cited sources all examine the precedents for the
light they shed on the existence of judicial review. Powell alone touches on the character of
the fundamental law used to invalidate legislative enactments.
3'Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in Julius Goebel, Jr.,
The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton: Documents and Commentary 393-419 (1964);
Trevett v. Weeden, described in James Mitchell Varnum, The Case, Trevett Against Weeden: On Information and Complaint, for refusing Paper Bills in Payment for Butcher's
Meat, in Market, at Par with Specie (1787); Holmes v. Walton, described in Austin Scott,
Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 Am.Hist.Rev. 456, 456-460 (1899); Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444 (Conn.Super.Ct. 1785); and the "Ten-Pound Act" cases in New
Hampshire, described in Crosskey, 2 Politics at 969-71 (cited in note 36). Scott's and Crosskey's descriptions suggest only that the courts were not clear in expressing their indifference
to whether the fundamental law was the written Constitution or unwritten natural law.

1136

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:1127

the written constitution or the unwritten natural law. In the sixth
case,"8 the opinion itself is confined to the written constitution, but
commentary by James Iredell, a leading North Carolina lawyer and
later a United States Supreme Court Justice, suggests a somewhat
broader reading. Finally, the last case3 9 clearly involves only issues
of allocation of power within the state government, and there are
indications in the opinions discussed below that this fact induced
the judges to confine their analysis to the written constitution.
* The case about which we have the most information is Rutgers
v. Waddington,40 a New York case decided in 1784. Elizabeth
Rutgers brought a trespass action, under a 1783 New York statute,
against Joshua Waddington, a British citizen who had occupied her
New York City property during the British occupation of that city
during the Revolutionary War. Alexander Hamilton, representing
defendant Waddington, alleged two defenses: that holding Waddington liable for the trespass violated the law of nations, and that
it violated the peace treaty between the United States and Great
Britain.
The inconsistency with the law of nations was clearly the primary defense. 4 ' Hamilton made two separate and complicated arguments from the law of nations, and in the several extant sets of
briefs and notes for argument he always put first the arguments
relating to the law of nations. The treaty defense appears almost as
an afterthought at some points:
CONSEQUENCE-The enemy having a right to the use of
the Plaintiffs property & having exercised their right through
the Defendant & for valuable consideration he cannot be
made answerable to another without injustice and a violation
of the law of Universal society. Further It cannot be done
without a violation of the Treaty of peace.42
Bayard v. Singleton, 1 Martin 42 (N.C. 1787).
Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5 (Va. 1782).
40 The decision is unreported, but the decision and various briefs and other pleadings
are reprinted in Goebel, Law Practice at 317-419 (cited in note 37). The opinion is also
reprinted in Thayer, Cases at 63-72 (cited in note 3).
"' Julius Goebel suggests that Hamilton's main object was to "move the obligation of
observing treaties from ... soft ground to the terra firma of legal imperative." Goebel, Law
Practice at 289 (cited in note 37). As the discussion in the text suggests, however, Hamilton's primary emphasis throughout was on the law of nations. His subjective motivation-if
there was one-appears not to have influenced his legal presentation.
4 Id. at 373 (Defendant's Brief No. 6). Here and elsewhere in this article, I rely not
only on judicial opinions, but also on the arguments made by lawyers. Although made in an
adversary context, these advocates' positions provide evidence of the types of arguments
considered legitimate and within the bounds of the legal culture of the period. In many
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Hamilton's discussion of the substance of the law of nations
and how it applies to Rutgers, moreover, suggests a general notion
of the law of nations as part of unwritten but judicially enforceable
fundamental law. The content of the law of nations, as "part of the
law of the land," may be "collected from the principles laid down
by writers on the subject and by the authorised practices of Nations at war." ' Based on an examination of such authorities, Hamilton argued that the defendant's act of trespass, because authorized by the appropriate military authority, was in accord with the
"laws customs and usages of nations in time of war."' 44 Finally,
Hamilton suggested that the law of nations was applicable in New
York first because it "results from the relations of Universal society," and only second because "our constitution adopts the common law of which the law of nations is a part. ' 45 The failure to
consider the written and ratified treaty as a more dispositive
source of fundamental law than "the relations of Universal Society" clearly indicates that Hamilton considered multiple sources of
fundamental law as equally valid and binding.
The court, in a maneuver worthy of John Marshall, upheld the
statute but denied the plaintiff relief. The court concluded that the
legislature, in enacting the trespass statute, could not have intended to enact a statute repugnant to the law of nations, at least
not without a non obstante clause announcing its intention. The
court thus interpreted the statute to prohibit the plaintiffs' suit,
despite its clear language to the contrary.48 The court relied solely
on the law of nations, concluding that Hamilton's reliance on the
treaty rested not on an express provision of the treaty but rather
on an interpretion which was itself derived from the law of nations.
The court therefore held that the treaty provided no more defense
than did the law of nations, and was thus virtually irrelevant.4 7
The court's judgment essentially operated to deny effect to a statute repugnant to the unwritten but fundamental law of nations.
Other factors also place Rutgers v. Waddington firmly within
instances, the advocate's position was ultimately adopted by the court; examining the briefs
and arguments further illuminates the court's own reasoning.
13 Id. at 340 (Defendant's Brief No. 2).
'4 Id. at 322 (Defendant's Plea); see also id. at 325.
Id. at 367-68 (Defendant's Brief No. 6)(emphasis by Hamilton); see also id. at 347-48
(Defendant's Brief No. 3).
'6Rutgers v. Waddington, reprinted in Goebel, Law Practice at 393, 415-419 (cited in
note 37).
"I Id. at 417. Hamilton himself apparently never reached this conclusion, as he carefully
separated all his arguments. His reliance on the law of nations thus was independent of the
treaty.
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the English opposition tradition. The court characterized Hamilton's defense as contending that "statutes against law and reason
are void." 48 It equated the law of nations with the law of nature,
holding that the "amiable precepts of the law of nature, are as obligatory on nations in their mutual intercourse, as they are on individuals in their conduct towards each other."4 An earlier action by
the New York Council of Revision-which consisted of the Governor and judges, and whose consent was necessary for any bill to
become law-was very similar to the court's decision in Rutgers.
The Council invalidated a law placing legal restrictions on English
citizens residing in New York, because "it established a principle
contradictory to the fundamental laws of every civilized nation, because it was contra[ry] to the law of nations, and because 'it contradict[ed] both the spirit and the letter of the provisional treaty
with Great Britain.' ",o Finally, the inevitable public and legislative uproar at the decision was directed not at the court's use of
the law of nations, but at its exercise of judicial review at all.5 1 In
New York, then, the spirit of the English opposition vision of fundamental law was congenial to the courts, the Council, and the
populace.
Trevett v. Weeden, 52 a 1786 Rhode Island case, similiarly illustrates the eighteenth century reliance on multiple sources of fundamental law. The Rhode Island legislature, apparently aware that
its statute requiring merchants to accept paper money was unpopular and might be nullified by.juries, provided that prosecutions
for violation of the act should be tried by special courts sitting
without juries. Trevett, following the procedure set out in the statute, lodged information against Weeden in the Superior Court for
the latter's refusal to accept paper money. One day after it heard
arguments, the Court dismissed the case without issuing an opinion, unanimously concluding that "the information was not cogni48 Id. at 395.

19 Id. at 400; see also id. at 404 ("The primary law of nations.., is no other than the
law of nature, so far as it is applicable to them.")(emphasis in original).
50 Goebel, Law Practice at 288, quoting Alfred Billings Street, The Council of Revision
of the State of New York 246-7 (1859)(cited in note 37).
"1 See Goebel, Law Practice at 312-15.
52 The case-decided by the Superior Court of Judicature of the City of Newport in
1786-is unreported, but the case and its aftermath are meticulously detailed by James
Mitchell Varnum, counsel for defendant Weeden, in Varnum, The Case (cited in note 37).
All citations will be to pages in his pamphlet. It is noteworthy that Varnum's pamphlet was
available for sale in Philadelphia during the Constitutional Convention. See Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Court the Constitution and Parties 44-45 (1912).
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zable before them.""3 Newspapers reported that three of the judges
had declared the act unconstitutional, one had found the court
54
without jurisdiction, and one had remained silent on his reasons.
While we thus cannot be certain what motivated the Court to refuse to enforce the statute-the judges were in fact later called
before the legislature to explain their actions, but refused to do so
on the ground that they were answerable only to God 5 5-we do
have a detailed record of the oral argument of counsel for the defendant. It is reasonable to assume that this argument is representative of legal analysis of the day, especially since it is so conformable to the other cases of pre-Revolutionary judicial review.
James Varnum, counsel for the defendant, made three arguments to support dismissal of the case. He contended first, that the
statute itself had expired by its own terms; second, that the special
court lacked jurisdiction because it was not subject to control by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Rhode Island; and third, "that the
Court is not, by said act, authorized and empowered to impanel a
jury to try the facts charged in the information; and so the same is
unconstitutional and void. ' 56 This last argument was alleged to be
"by far the most important."57 Varnum's strategy on this argument
consisted of demonstrating that trial by jury was "a fundamental
right, a part of our legal constitution, '58 that the legislature was
not empowered to alter the constitution, and that the Court had an
obligation to invalidate any law violative of the constitution.
For purposes of demonstrating Varnum's conception of the
character and content of the constitution, the first of Varnum's
premises-that trial by jury is protected by the constitution-is
obviously most important. The Rhode Island Charter of 1663,
59
which was still in effect, contained no guarantee of trial by jury.
Varnum therefore demonstrated the existence of such a right by a
historical review designed to show that Englishmen had possessed
a right to trial by jury since "time out of mind. ' 60 He began with
Blackstone's discussion of the Magna Carta, quoting copiously
51

Varnum, The Case at 1, 38-39 (cited in note 37).

5

See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 Harv.L.Rev.

30, 66 (1926).
55 Varnum, The Case at 38-43 (cited in note 37).
56 Id. at 2-3.

Id. at 11.
58 Id.
67

59 See Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions at 3211 (cited in note 18).
60 Varnum, The Case at 12 (cited in note 37), quoting William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *127-28.
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from the Commentaries and concluding:
From these passages in Judge Blackstone's Commentaries,
from the variety of authorities to which he refers, and from
many others of the greatest reputation, it most clearly appears, that the trial by jury was ever esteemed a first, a fundamental, and a most essential principle, in the English constitution. From England this sacred right was transferred to this
country, and hath continued, through all the changes in our
government, the firm basis of our liberty, the fairest inheritance transmitted by our ancestors!6 '
He appealed virtually indiscriminately to "the fundamental laws of
England, 6 2 to Blackstone's Commentaries," to "the English constitution," 64 to the Rhode Island Charter, 5 to the Magna Carta,6 6
to acts of the Rhode Island legislature-which he described as "not
creative of a new law, but declaratory of the rights of all the people" 6 7-and to the 1774 Declaration of Rights enacted by the first
Congress."8 He concluded this portion of his argument by suggesting that his historical evidence proved that trial by jury was a
fundamental right:
If the first act of the English Parliament now upon record,
containing the great charter of the privileges of subjects:-If
the exercise of those privileges for ages:-If the settlement of
a new world to preserve them:-If the first solemn compact of
the people of this State:-If the sacred declarations of the
Legislature at different periods, and upon the most important
occasions:-If the solemn appeal to heaven of the United
States:--In short, if the torrents of blood that have been shed
in defence of our invaded rights, are proofs, then have we triumphed in the cause of humanity, then have we shewn that
the trial by jury is the birthright of the people! 9
Varnum then went on to ask whether the legislature should be
permitted to "deprive citizens of their constitutional right, the trial
61Varnum, The Case at 13-14.
62 Id. at 11, 15.

63Id. at 11-13.
64 Id.-at 14.
65 Id. at 14-15.
66 Id. at 11, 15.
67

Id. at 15-16.

68 Id. at 16.
69 Id. at 17-18.
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by jury, 1 70 easily concluding that it should not be. Even this portion of the argument is replete with references to natural law, suggesting that "[t]here are certain general principles that are equally
binding in all governments,"' 71 and appealing again to the law of
nature, the laws of' 72 God, "common right," and "reason," and
"unalienable rights.
He summarized his argument by stating that he had "attempted to shew . . . That the trial by jury is a fundamental, a
constitutional right-ever claimed as such-ever ratified as
such-ever held most dear and sacred. ' 73 The whole tenor of
Varnum's argument is clearly an appeal to unwritten fundamental
law, derived from multiple and diverse sources.
Considerably less is known about a 1780 New Jersey case,
Holmes v. Walton. 4 The case involved another transgression on
the right to trial by jury, this time a New Jersey statute that allowed conviction for trading with the enemy by a jury of only six
men. A convicted defendant took an appeal to the state supreme
court, which reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. No
record of the court's opinion has been found, but the supreme
court minutes do describe the arguments made by defendant's
counsel. He argued that the trial by a six-man jury was "contrary
to law," "contrary to the constitution of New Jersey," and "contrary to the constitution, practices, and laws of the land. ' 75 The
New Jersey Constitution of 1776 did provide for trial by jury, but
without any further elaboration as to the nature of the jury. 76 The
"laws of the land" thus most likely referred to various charters and
legislative enactments.7 Standing alone, this sparse information
about Holmes v. Walton might not prove much, but in the context
of the other state cases, it suggests that in New Jersey, as in other
states, fundamental law was derived from more than the written
constitution.
Several minor cases, one in Connecticut and a series of related
cases in New Hampshire, deserve brief comment as consistent with
70
7

Id. at 20.
Id. at 23.

"2 Id. at 29-31, 35.
73 Id. at 35.
71 The case is unreported, and no written record of the decision itself exists. The arguments of counsel and other surrounding circumstances, however, are described in Scott, 4
Am.Hist.Rev. 456 (cited in note 37). All citations are to that work.
7

Quoted in id. at 458.

7'6 Thorpe,

Federal and State Constitutions at 2598 (N.J.Const. of 1776 art. XXII)(cited
in note 18).
7 Scott, 4 Am.Hist.Rev. at 458-59 (cited in note 37).
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the cases in the other states. The Symsbury Case,8 a 1785 Connecticut case, resolved a land ownership dispute between parties
claiming under different legislative grants. The court ruled in favor
of the earlier grantees, on the ground that "[t]he act of the general
assembly [granting title to the later grantees] . . . could not legally
operate to curtail the land before granted to the [earlier grantees],
without their consent. '7 9 The dissent agreed that the earlier grantees "could not have their grant taken from them, or curtailed, even
by the general assembly, without their consent," but found the
requisite consent. s0 Neither opinion referred to any fundamental
law in support of this conclusion. However, the 1662 Charter of
Connecticut, which had been reconfirmed in 1776, s1 did not contain any provisions that might have protected property rights in
this way,82 which strongly suggests that the judges in Symsbury
were relying on the unwritten rights of man.
The 1786 New Hampshire cases are unreported, but were described in Philadelphia newspapers.83 Judges in New Hampshire
refused to follow a legislative enactment depriving creditors in
small cases of a trial by jury, because the 1784 New Hampshire
Constitution guaranteed the right to trial by jury.8 4 The legislature
then considered and rejected a motion to impeach the judges of
one of the defiant courts, the Inferior Court of Common Pleas of
Rockingham County. The legislature instead ultimately voted to
repeal the offensive law. The Philadelphia Independent Gazette
and the Pennsylvania Packet reported this last development as
"justif[ying] the conduct of the Justices of the Inferior Court who
ha[d] uniformly opposed [the act] as unconstitutional and unjust."' This suggests that either the judges, the legislature, or the
author of the newspaper article recognized a legally significant relationship between a law's unconstitutionality and its injustice.
Again, this is consistent with the tradition of inherent rights.
In two cases from this period, the judges confined themselves

1 Kirby 444 (Conn.Super.Ct. 1785).
Id. at 447.
80 Id. at 452.
" Adams, First American Constitutions at 66 and n.7 (cited in note 17).
82 See Charter of Connecticut of 1662, reprinted in Thorpe, Federal and State Constitu78
79

tions at 529-536 (cited in note 18).
83 I am relying on Crosskey's description of the case although I reject his conclusions.
See Crosskey, 2 Politics at 969-971 (cited in note 36).
81 See N.H.Const. art. XX, in Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions at 2456 (cited in
note 18).
Il Quoted in Crosskey, 2 Politics at 970-71 (emphasis added) (cited in note 36).
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to the written constitution. One is Bayard v. Singleton,s6 a 1787
North Carolina case. The case involved an act that authorized a
judge, acting without a jury, to quiet title in some situations by
dismissing a plaintiff's suit for ejectment. In a very short opinion
denying the defendant's motion to dismiss such a suit, the court in
Bayard unanimously held that "by the constitution every citizen
had undoubtedly a right to a decision of his property by a trial by
jury," and that "no act [the legislature] could pass, could by any
87
means repeal or alter the constitution.
Two factors suggest that Bayard's apparent exclusive reliance
on the written constitution was not a true deviation from the observed pattern. First, reliance on a clear written protection of
rights does not indicate the appropriate grounds of decision when
the written document contains no such provision. Second, one
leading commentator suggested at the time that judicial review was
not limited to scrutiny of the written constitution. On August 12,
1787, Richard Dobbs Spaight, a North Carolina delegate to the
Federal Convention in Philadelphia at the time, wrote to James
Iredell, criticizing Bayard."' Iredell responded on August 26 with a
long letter defending the practice of judicial review. In the course
of that letter, Iredell made clear that the written constitution was
not the sole source of fundamental law:
Without an express Constitution the powers of the Legislature
would undoubtedly have been absolute (as the Parliament in
Great Britain is held to be), and any act passed not inconsistent with natural justice (for that curb is avowed by the
judges even in England), would have been binding on the
people.89
In 1787, Iredell clearly viewed a written constitution as supplementing natural law rather than as replacing it with a single
instrument.
The other case apparently departing from the usual pattern of
judicial review is Commonwealth v. Caton,9" a 1782 Virginia case
88 1 Martin 42 (N.C. 1787).
867
Id. at 45. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 did in fact contain a guarantee of
trial by jury. See N.C.Const. of 1776 art. XIV, in Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions at
2788 (cited in note 18).
" Richard Dobb Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in Griffith J. McRee, 2 Life
and Correspondence of James Iredell 168-170 (1857).
" Iredell to Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in id. at 172 (emphasis in original letter).
80 4 Call 5 (Va. 1782). The case was not actually reported until 1827, after the institution of judicial review had become more widely known. That the case was reconstructed 45
years after it occurred has led to some dispute about its authenticity. Crosskey suggests that
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which is the first reported case in the United States in which a
court reviewed a statute for constitutionality. Caton and others
had been sentenced to death for treason under a 1776 statute that,
in addition to defining the treason, removed the pardon power
from the executive to the legislature. The lower house of the legislature (the House of Delegates) passed a resolution pardoning the
prisoners, but the Senate refused to concur. When the attorney
general moved the court for authority to execute the prisoners, Caton and his fellows responded that the 1776 statute must either be
interpreted to grant pardon power to the House of Delegates alone
or be held unconstitutional. 9 ' The Virginia Court of Appeals, to
which the case was sent by the trial court because of its novelty
and difficulty, found the statute constitutional and held the singlehouse attempt at pardon ineffective.
As was the custom, the judges delivered their opinions seriatim, unanimously concluding both that they had the power to exercise constitutional review over legislative enactments and that the
1776 statute was constitutional. Only two of the eight judges considered the constitutional question in any detail. Judge Wythe,
whose opinion was the most extensive, characterized the power of
judicial review as that of declaring the law "when those, who hold
the purse and the sword [differ] as to the powers which each may
exercise." 92 He viewed his duty as "protect[ing] one branch of the
legislature, and, consequently, the whole community, against the
usurpations of the other. '93 He thus clearly recognized that only a
single aspect of judicial review was at issue in Caton: mediating
between the different branches of the government. 94 As might be

the reporter, Daniel Call, fabricated parts of it to make a strong case for judicial review. See
Crosskey, 2 Politics at 952-53 (cited in note 36). Judge Pendleton's biographer, on the other
hand, uses Pendleton's own contemporaneous notes of the case to support Call's reporting.
See David John Mays, 2 Edmund Pendleton 1721-1803: A Biography 187-202 (1952). Additionally, the late publication date suggests, if anything, a tendency to conform to the more
narrow reliance on the written constitution that developed later. To the extent that the
report is untrustworthy, then, it probably serves to strengthen rather than weaken the thesis
that judges during this period relied on unwritten as well as written fundamental law.
"' The argument was that the Virginia Constitution gave the House of Delegates sole
pardon authority in those cases-such as impeachments-where it stripped the executive of
pardon power; Caton thus argued that in all instances where the executive lacked authority
to pardon, the power lay solely with the House of Delegates.
92

Caton, 4 Call at 7.

91 Id. at 8.
91 It
is quite clear that Judge Wythe recognized the court's duty to exercise another
aspect of judicial review. He noted that if the whole legislature (both houses) "attempt[ed]
to overleap the bounds, prescribed to them by the people, [he], pointing to the constitution,
[would] say, to them, here is the limit of your authority." Id. Since he was not in fact con-
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expected in a society in which a written constitution was viewed as
the sole prescription for the form of government, Judge Wythe
then upheld the 1776 act by examining carefully the language,
structure, and purpose of the Virginia constitutional provisions relating to separation of powers. Judge Wythe's opinion, however, indicates nothing about whether he thought the written constitution
should play the same paramount role in a dispute not involving the
structure of government.
Judge Pendleton also upheld the 1776 act, spending relatively
little time on the question of judicial review and more on a careful
exegesis of the constitutional clause most directly relevant. Judge
Pendleton, however, did frame the former issue in a most telling
manner. He declared that the first of the "two great points" before
the court was "whether, if the constitution of government and the
act declaring what shall be treason are at variance on this subject,
which shall prevail and be the rule of judgment? ' 95 The phrase
"constitution of government" seems to be referring quite specifically to a document constituting or forming or setting up the government. He thus used "constitution" in its older sense, as the
noun formed from the verb "to constitute." This is consistent both
with Judge Wythe's framing of the issue and with the Revolutionary era use of the terms, and suggests that Judge Pendleton might
have viewed the written constitution as most relevant in cases involving the structure of government."
These cases suggest that for American judges in the late eighteenth century, the sources of fundamental law were as openended as they were in English opposition theory. The colonists inherited a tradition that provided not only a justification for judicial review but also guidelines for its exercise. As Bolingbroke proposed in theory and the new American states translated into
action, judges were to look to natural law and the inherent rights
of man, as well as to the written constitution, in determining the
validity of a statute. Where the written constitution affirmatively
addressed a problem-most often in governmental structure cases
such as Caton, but even in cases, such as Bayard, where the constitution provided clear protection of individual rights-it was discerned with such an overleaping of bounds by the whole legislature but rather with relations
between the two houses, the case gives no indication of what types of argument he might
have used to define the constitutional limits.
11 Id. at 17. The second point he identified was whether the constitution and statute
were in fact at variance.
"' The rest of the judges, in a single paragraph that added nothing, agreed with the
earlier expressed opinions of Judges Wythe and Pendleton. Id. at 20.
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positive, but in other cases, judges looked outside the written
constitution.
II.

INVENTING THE CONSTITUTION

By 1787, then, Americans had a clear vision of the nature of a
constitution as a species of fundamental law. Like natural law and
laws or traditions that had existed since time immemorial, it could
be used to invalidate positive law, but again like natural law and
those long-established laws and traditions, a constitution was not
itself seen as positive, enacted law but rather as a declaration of
first principles. Moreover, because of the constitution's character
as largely a declaration of indubitable truths and time-tested customs, its fundamentality did not depend on popular origin or approbation. The only exception to the non-positive nature of the
constitution lay in its function as a charter of government or allocation of powers among parts of the government. As this section
will suggest, even that exception was hazy in the minds of those in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.
The first drafts and early debates in the Convention suggest
that most delegates still held these views of the character of a constitution. The Constitution they were drafting was, at the beginning, neither positive law nor popularly grounded. As the summer
progressed, the delegates began to formulate and understand two
concepts crucial to understanding the Constitution as a sui generis
form of positive law: self-referential enforceability and extra-legislative origin. By self-referential enforceablity I mean the notion
that the Constitution declared itself to be fundamental law, thus
suggesting that positive enactment rather than inherent nature
made a written constitution fundamental. By extra-legislative origin, I mean the notion that legislatures lacked power to enact fundamental law. Both of these concepts were in direct conflict with
the English vision of a constitution as inherently fundamental and
accretionally derived from natural law and unchallenged legislative
acts.97
Comparing the delegates' views at the beginning and end of
the Convention on each of these concepts illustrates how the Convention invented the idea of the Constitution. The contrasting vi'W Corwin similarly suggested that the modern view of the Constitution involves two
ideas: "One is the so-called 'positive' conception of law as a general expression merely for
the particular commands of a human lawgiver, as a series of acts of human will; the other is
that the highest possible source of such commands, because the highest possible embodiment of human will, is 'the people.'" Corwin, 42 Harv.L.Rev. at 151 (cited in note 9).
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sions of the positive and self-referentially enforceable nature of the
Constitution are most obvious in the history of the Supremacy
Clause. The contrasting visions of the source of the Constitution's
authority are most clearly framed by the Convention debates about
methods of ratification. I will compare early and late views on each
of these questions in turn, and then examine in detail a crucial
midsummer discussion that marked a turning point in the Convention's progress.
A.

The Constitution as Positive Law

Like the Articles of Confederation, the first draft of the Constitution-Edmund Randolph's Virginia Plan-lacked any explicit
mechanism by which its terms could be judicially enforced against
recalcitrant states. The sole method by which the federal government might defend itself against state encroachments lay in Resolution 6: "that the National Legislature ought to be impowered
: . . to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening
in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union.""8
Madison admitted that he knew of no other mechanism to prevent
state aggrandizement at the expense of the national government;
should Resolution 6 fail to pass, "the only remedy [would] lie in an
appeal to coercion." 99 As an enacted frame of government-one
choice of framework among many-the Constitution might not
have been viewed as judicially enforceable fundamental law apart
from pre-existing natural law. Unlike the acts of the national legislature, however, it was not yet seen as a species of positive law.
The first to envision the potentially positive nature of the
Constitution was Alexander Hamilton. In his rambling speech on
June 18, Hamilton proposed a version of the supremacy clause. His
version, however, was a hybrid. It provided both that "[a]ll laws of
the particular States contrary to the Constitution or laws of the
United States [shall] be utterly void," and that the national legislature would have a negative over state laws. 00 While Hamilton
was thus the first to suggest that the Constitution might specify its
own legal effect independent of the action of the national legislature, he was apparently unwilling to trust its enforceablity. Almost
a month into the Convention, even Hamilton failed to recognize
that the Constitution, like statutes, could give positive instructions

IS

Madison's Notes at 31 (May 29)(cited in note 6).

99 Id. at 88 (June 8).
100 Id. at 139 (June 18).
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to judges on its own authority. Hamilton's ideas, moreover, were
largely ignored at the time: one commentator has suggested that
the Convention reacted to the June 18 speech "rather as if they
had taken a day off to attend the opera." 10 1
A month later, Luther Martin finally introduced the provision
that became the supremacy clause. On July 17, the Convention
voted against allowing the national legislature to veto state laws.
Martin immediately moved instead "that the Legislative acts of
the U.S. made by virtue & in pursuance of the articles of Union,
and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U.S.
shall be the supreme law of the respective States.' 0 2 The delegates
agreed to Martin's resolution without opposition, 0 3 so we may assume that this formulation represented the sentiment of the Convention at the time. Substituting a provision in the Constitution
for a power of Congress evidenced a recognition that the Constitution had inherent force, but the delegates at this point still had a
very limited conception of the positive nature of the Constitution.
Martin's version of the supremacy clause, which made only statutes and not the Constitution itself supreme, did not contemplate
a constitution any different from the existing written constitutions:
it specified how the powers of government were to be allocated,
without any suggestion of where it derived its own authority.
As late as August 14 the delegates still could not envision the
Constitution as positive law. In a discussion of whether federal legislators ought to be eligible for other -offices, John Francis Mercer
explicitly distinguished between federal legislation and the
Constitution:
It is a great mistake to suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the U. States? It is The men whom it will
bring into the Govern't and interest in maintaining it that is
to govern them. The paper will only mark out the mode & the
4
0

form.1

Mercer seems here to be viewing the Constitution only as a specific
101John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers:

A Reform Caucus in Action, 55

Am.Pol.Sci.Rev. 799, 807 (1961).
102 Madison's Notes at 305-06 (July 17)(cited in note 6).
103 Id. at 306. The delegates clearly recognized that Martin's supremacy clause was an
alternative to the legislative veto over state laws. When Charles Pinckney tried to revive the
national veto, on August 23, Roger Sherman responded that such a provision was unnecessary, because "the laws of the General Government [are] Supreme & paramount to the State
laws according to the plan, as it now stands." Id. at 518 (Aug. 23).
"I Id. at 455 (Aug. 14).
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charter of government. Although both Wilson and Gouverneur
Morris immediately responded to Mercer, they responded only on
the substantive question of eligibility; apparently no delegate saw
need to question the nature of the Constitution as Mercer had outlined it.
One intermediate development deserves mention. The delegates apparently grasped the possibility that state constitutions
might be considered analogous to legislative enactments earlier
than they reached a similar conclusion regarding the federal Constitution. The Committee of Detail's draft added to the partially
formed supremacy clause the provision that national laws were to
be superior to state constitutions as well as to state statutes. 105
This change does not require envisioning state constitutions as enacted law, much less envisioning the federal Constitution as enacted law, but it does suggest that state constitutions are in the
same category as enacted law. It is significant that the Committee
of Detail began meeting only four days after the crucial exchange
on July 23, discussed below, in which the Convention seemed for
the first time to regard the Constitution they were drafting as a
positive enactment of the people.
It was not until the last weeks of the Convention, however,
that the concept of the federal Constitution as positive law crystallized enough to find its way into the document. First, on August
23, John Rutledge moved to add the words "This Constitution" to
the Supremacy Clause, which was accepted without opposition. 0 6
Four days later, William Samuel Johnson moved to add to the article defining federal jurisdiction, cases arising under the Constitution. After a brief dispute about limiting federal jurisdiction generally to "cases of a Judiciary nature," the delegates also agreed to
Johnson's amendment without opposition.1 07 Each of these uncon,05 Id. at 390 (Aug. 6)(art. VIII of Committee of Detail draft). The Resolutions submitted to the Committee of Detail provided only that federal laws shall be supreme, "any thing
in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary, notwithstanding." Id. at 381
(July 17)(Resolution VII). The draft that came out of the Committee kept most of Resolution VII (renumbered as Article VIII) intact, but made federal law supreme, "any thing in
the Constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding." There apparently is no evidence of the reasoning or deliberations behind this change.
,0' Madison's Notes at 517 (Aug. 23).
10I Id. at 538-39 (Aug. 27). Goebel concludes that both these uncontroversial additions
merely confirm the general consensus that judges were to serves as "the watch and ward
over the Constitution." Goebel, History at 238, 241 (cited in note 3). The practical transition
from inherent invalidation of unconstitutional statutes to judicial invalidation of such statutes, however, had already taken place in the states, and the Convention from the beginning
assumed that federal judges would exercise such power. It is therefore unlikely that the
delegates waited until the last weeks of the Convention to add to the Constitution a doc-
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troversial amendments marks an identical recognition that the
Constitution could, by enactment rather than by nature, become
part of the body of laws, and that it could specify its own status as
fundamental law. The sense of the Convention had altered: the
idea of the Constitution as positive law had taken hold.
B. The Constitution Enacted By the People
The Virginia Plan also failed to provide any theoretically cohesive doctrine of the relationship between constitution and populace. Resolution 15 provided that the Convention's proposed
amendments to the Articles of Confederation should be submitted
first to Congress for its "approbation" and then to "an assembly or
assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people."' 8 Labelling the Convention's product as "amendments" to the existing Articles of Confederation was a transparent and unsuccessful attempt to hide the
Convention's lack of authority to adopt resolutions which so differed from the existing Articles. 10 9 What is more significant is the
proposed mode of ratification, which suggests that the drafters of
the Virginia Plan still did not envision the constitution as wholly
extra-legislative in origin. First, the submission of the proposed articles to Congress indicated that the state legislatures there represented were to have a role in deciding on the form of the new
government. 110
trine that was so well-accepted from the beginning. The explanation in the text is therefore
much more likely.
'0'Madison's Notes at 33 (May 29).

'09 Antifederalist delegates commented on the subterfuge on the very first day Randolph's plan was discussed, General Pinkney expressing "doubt" whether either Congress or
the state legislatures had "authorise[d] a discussion of a System founded on different principles from the federal Constitution." Madison's Notes at 35 (May 30). This debate over the
Convention's lack of authority continued throughout the debates. For an interesting discussion of the implications of the illegality of the Constitution, see Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 Const.Comm. 57 (1987).
ItoSee Kay, 4 Const.Comm. at 68. The delegates clearly recognized that submission to
Congress was tantamount to conditioning ratification on the approval of the state legislatures. See Madison's Notes at 611-14 (Sept. 10). The nationalists objected to the requirement of Congressional approbation on the same two principles that governed their rejection
of state legislative ratification: the unlikelihood of passage and the want of power. See, e.g.,
id. at 611 (Fitzsimons: "the words 'for their approbation' had been struck out in order to
save Congress from the necessity of an Act inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation
under which they held their authority"); id. at 613 (Wilson: "can it be safe to make the
assent of Congress necessary"). By this point in the Convention, the popular basis of sovereignty was increasingly well established. The resolution on August 31 which removed the
requirement of Congressional approbation passed by a margin of eight to three. The first
motion made on September 10 to re-require Congressional approval failed by a margin of
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Second, and more important, the debates reveal that at this
time, the primary motivation for suggesting popular rather than
legislative ratification was practical: the state legislatures could not
be expected to approve a document which divested them of a considerable part of their powers. In response to antifederalist objections to the proposed popular ratification, Madison replied that
two reasons supported popular over legislative ratification. He argued that legislative ratification would put the Constitution and
the federal government at a practical disadvantage in subsequent
disputes with state statutes, and that the Articles of Confederation
had already been breached and thus the Articles' requirement of
legislative ratification was no longer in force."' Rufus King put the
matter more bluntly: "The [state] Legislatures also being to lose
1 2
power, will be most likely to raise objections. "
By August 31, the tenor of the discussion had changed significantly. When Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out the requirement of ratification by conventions of the people, some of the delegates, including King, reiterated their practical objections to
legislative ratification. Both Madison and King, however, added
another argument in favor of popular ratification. Madison noted:
"The people were, in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills of rights,
that first principles might be resorted to.""' King added that
"[t]he State[s] must have contemplated a recurrence to first principles before they sent deputies to this Convention."" 4 Those in
favor of popular ratification had grasped a crucial and ultimately
successful theory to justify what began as a purely practical
mechanism.
C.

The Turning Point

The contrast between the first and last weeks of the Convention is thus quite stark. The clearest illustration of the turning
point for both concepts is a debate on July 23 over ratification procedures. The last two delegates had finally arrived that morning
from New Hampshire, and the Convention was nearing the end of
its detailed consideration of the Randolph Plan. They had settled
ten to one; the second was disagreed to without dissent.
" Madison's Notes at 70 (June 5).
1.2Id. at 71 (June 5). See also Kay, 4 Const.Comm. at 66-67, 71 (cited in note 109).
11 Madison's Notes at 564 (Aug. 31).
114Id.
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on a basic structure that was to change very little; only the executive branch remained inchoate. Having essentially finished debate
over the first eighteen of the resolutions adopted by the Committee of the Whole, the Convention turned to the last resolution:
Resolved. that the amendments which shall be offered to the
confederation by the Convention, ought at a proper time or
times, after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an
assembly or assemblies of representatives, recommended by
the several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the People
to consider and decide thereon. 115
Oliver Ellsworth and William Paterson immediately moved
that the new Constitution be submitted to the state legislatures
instead."' Ironically, George Mason of Virginia, who ultimately refused to sign the Constitution, took the lead in refuting this renewed antifederalist call for legislative ratification. His eloquent
defense of popular ratification provides the first clear picture of
the Constitution as popularly enacted law.
Mason made three interrelated arguments. He denied that the
state legislatures had power to ratify the new Constitution, arguing
that they were "mere creatures of the State Constitutions," and
could not act outside the authority conferred on them by their constitutions. Moreover, even assuming that some legislatures had authority to ratify the new Constitution, "it would be wrong to refer
the plan to them, because succeeding Legislatures having equal authority could undo the acts of their predecessors." Finally, he identified the people as the source of all power, suggesting both that
they retained power not delegated to the state legislatures and that
some state governments were "not derived from the clear & undisputed authority of the people" and thus were a shaky foundation
on which to rest the federal Constitution.' 17
Mason's arguments clearly suggest that the Constitution is
popularly based, but they also suggest, somewhat more subtly, that
the Constitution is enacted law. By equating the possible source of
legislative power to ratify the Constitution with the source of other
legislative powers (in arguing that such a power was not conferred
by state constitutions), Mason drew an implicit analogy between
115 Id. at 151 (June 19) ("State of the resolutions submitted to the consideration of the
House by the honorable Mr. Randolph, as altered, amended, and agreed to, in a Committee
of the whole House").
116 Id. at 348 (July 23).
17

Id.
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legitimately enacted laws and an enacted-albeit unsuccessfully
enacted-Constitution. Mason also equated the effect of legislative
ratification of the Constitution with the effect of ordinary legislative enactments (in arguing that subsequent legislatures could
undo the act), further suggesting that he viewed the Constitution
as a species of enacted law.
After some desultory discussion of the practical impediments
to legislative ratification, which did not seem to convince the antifederalists, other delegates began to continue Mason's theme.
Gouverneur Morris suggested that a Constitution ratified by less
than all thirteen state legislatures would "clearly not be valid" and
"[t]he Judges would consider [it] as null & void.""" In discussions
two days earlier, virtually all the delegates had assumed that the
federal courts would have power to nullify statutes inconsistent
with the federal constitution." 9 Thus Morris's argument is also
premised on a view of the Constitution as equivalent to other positively enacted law. Morris also contrasted ineffective legislative
ratification with popular ratification, arguing that because the people are the "supreme authority, the federal compact may be altered by a majority of them." 2 0° Morris, perhaps because persuaded by Mason's earlier argument, here endorsed the same
redefinition of the Constitution as popularly enacted law that Mason had articulated.
Even Madison, who had until then relied solely on practical
arguments to support popular ratification, picked up the theoretical justifications. He echoed Mason's contention of legislative incompetence, noting that "it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine
that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it
held its existence."' 2' Ever quick to synthesize and to restate with
rhetorical flourish arguments he agreed with, he then caught the
essence of the Convention's new invention:
He considered the difference between a system founded on
the Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be
the true difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution. The former in point of moral obligation might be as
inviolable as the latter. [However, a] law violating a treaty
ratified by a pre-existing law, might be respected by the
Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A law
118

Id. at 351 (July 23).

120

See id. at 336-343 (July 21).
Id. at 351 (July 23)(emphasis in original).

2I Id. at 352 (July 23).
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violating a constitution established by the people themselves,
would be considered by the Judges as null & void.'2 2
This speech illustrates the contrast between a written constitution
that is part of judicially enforceable fundamental law specifically
because it has been enacted by the people and the earlier view of a
written constitution as merely a frame of government, to be en12
forced only where the framers have the requisite sovereignty. 1
The antifederalist response to Mason also illustrates the contrast between Mason's insight and the older view of a Constitution
as merely a compact-a recipe for confederated government, rather
than a law. Ellsworth found Mason's fear of subsequent legislative
repeals unfounded, since "[a]n Act to which the States by their
Legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a compact from
which no one of the parties can recede of itself.' 1 24 This is a view
of the constitution not as fundamental law reduced to writing, but
as merely a structure arrived at by contractual agreement.
The theoretical arguments were persuasive: only three states
voted in favor of the Ellsworth motion to submit the Constitution
to the state legislatures, and only Delaware then voted against Resolution 19 as it stood unamended. 25 This seems to have been the
crucial debate in the evolution of the delegates' vision of the Constitution they were creating. The next attempt to reinstate legislative ratification was quickly and easily rebuffed,' 26 and the rest of
the proposed Constitution was amended, with little or no opposition, to conform to the idea of a positive law enacted by the
people.
The framers have been credited with the innovative achievement of
identify[ing] 'the Constitution' with a single normative document instead of a historical tradition, and thus . . . creat[ing]
122 Id.

at 352-53 (July 23)(emphasis in original).

2I The lack of sovereignty might derive, for example, from the interplay between state

and federal governments, or-in the British system-from the failure of Parliament to enact
into positive law a treaty negotiated and executed by the Crown.
2 Madison's Notes at 350 (July 23). Ellsworth's argument was ultimately internally
inconsistent. In addition to the argument outlined in the text, he refuted the common belief
that some state legislatures would refuse to ratify a Constitution that deprived them of so
much power, by arguing that the Constitution could legitimately be a "partial compact" if
only some legislatures consented. Id. at 351. Since the existing compact, the Articles of Confederation, required unanimous consent for amendments, allowing some states to withdraw
from the existing compact and form a new "partial compact" seems inconsistent with his
earlier argument that state legislatures could not unilaterally withdraw from a compact.
Id. at 353 (July 23).
128 See id. at 563-64 (Aug. 31).
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the possibility of treating constitutional interpretation as an
exercise in the traditional legal activity of construing a written
1
instrument. 1
A review of the historical context and the debates themselves suggests that this gives the framers both too much and too little credit
for their inventions. Parts I and II of this article have suggested
that the framers did more than embody fundamental law in a single document; they recognized that such fundamental law might be
positively enacted by the people, rather than simply memorialized.128 On the other hand, Part III will suggest that they did not
intend to embody all of fundamental law in a "single normative
document." The effect of these innovations on the nature of interpretation of a culture's fundamental law is thus somewhat more
complex than the shift from construing a common law tradition to
interpreting a written instrument.

III.

THE INVENTED CONSTITUTION AND INHERITED TRADITIONS

In creating the notion of the Constitution as popularly enacted
positive law, the framers had invented an idea that perfectly suited
their liberal needs. As one scholar has noted, the difference between prior constitutions and the framers' new invention was the
difference between government by consensus and government by
command.' 29 The Constitution, although derived originally from
the people, thus became a source of law to be imposed from above
rather than dependent on the continuing support of the population. This transition, in turn, coincides with the transition from a
unified "regime," where law and morality are intertwined and formulated by the community, to a more limited "government,"
which separates law (imposed on the community) from morality.130
This difference is the classic identifier of the transition from a
12 Powell, 98 Harv.L.Rev. at 902 (cited at note 1); see also Oscar Handlin and Mary

Handlin, The Dimensions of Liberty at 55 (1961)("In the New World the term, constitution,
no longer referred to the actual organization of power developed through custom, prescription, and precedent. Instead it had come to mean a written frame of government setting
fixed limits on the use of power"); Melvin Yazawa, From Colonies to Commonwealth: Familial Ideology and the Beginnings of the American Republic at 112-13 (1985)(The American
constitution "unlike the English constitution, was not a living and growing body of customs,
statutes, and institutions [but rather] solemn embodiments of the sovereign will of the
people.").
128 Gordon Wood called this achievement "an extraordinary invention", and "the most
distinctive institutional contribution . . . the American Revolutionaries made to Western
politics." Wood, Creation at 342 (cited in note 20).
129 Powell, 98 Harv.L.Rev. at 909 (cited in note 1).
130 Jacobsohn, Supreme Court at 31-32 (cited in note 5).
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classical republican outlook to a modern liberal one.
Had the framers intended their new Constitution to displace
prior fundamental law, the transition would have been complete.''
This section will suggest, however, that the notion of the Constitution as popularly enacted positive law did not serve to replace the
earlier idea of fundamental law as inherent and declared rather
than enacted, but instead merely complemented the older tradition.13 2 The architects of our constitutional system assumed that
appeals to natural law would continue despite the existence of a
written Constitution. This hypothesis can be established by juxtaposing the evidence (from Part II) of the framers' dawning recognition that fundamental law could be enacted if the enacting authority were the people, against contemporaneous or subsequent
discussions of the status of natural rights.
As Part II suggests, the American invention of the Constitution was well underway by July 23, and was largely complete by
the end of the Convention in September. This invention consisted
of the transition from envisioning a written constitution as merely
a declaration of-and against a background of-older fundamental
law, to recognizing the framing of the Constitution as an act creating fundamental law. If the invented Constitution is viewed as a
substitute for natural law, this transition appears temporary. On
July 21, and again on August 22, the debates in the Convention
seem to move backward, reverting to earlier natural law concepts.
Then in 1789, during legislative debates on the Bill of Rights, the
same apparent reversion seems to occur. Finally, in a series of seminal Supreme Court cases between 1789 and 1819, the Constitution
is once again relegated to merely a part of a broader fundamental
law. This section will examine each of these examples in turn, and
will suggest that rather than representing a view inconsistent with
the Convention's invented Constitution, these examples indicate
131 One author, for example, argues that there can be no "higher law" or unwritten

Constitution precisely because the framers intended to incorporate or embody natural law
in the written Constitution itself. Jacobsohn, Supreme Court at chap. 5 generally, especially
at 75 (appeals "to higher law" useful to explicate text)(cited in irote 5); see also Thomas C.
Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan.L.Rev. 1, 16 (1984)(the Constitution enacts
"the web of society's basic institutions and ideals, its 'unwritten constitution' "); Murphy,
Art at 140-155 (the Constitution has been interpreted to include natural rights as part of its
"spirit")(cited in note 13).
"2 Any conflict between popular sovereignty and natural law was, at least until the
mid-1790s, more apparent than real, since "the Revolutionary generation, believing in the
people's inherent goodness, simply assumed that all laws made by the people would be consistent with fundamental rights." William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background
of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 Mich.L.Rev. 893, 928 (1978).
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that the invented Constitution was intended merely to complement, not to replace, the earlier tradition. The innovation of the
summer of 1787 was to explain why a written constitution was a
part of fundamental law, not to redefine the whole of fundamental
law.
A. The Convention and Fundamental Law
On August 22, a month after the crucial discussion over ratification, and one day before the supremacy clause took on its final
uncontroversial phraseology, the delegates engaged in a debate
that seems .to undermine the vision of the Constitution as positively enacted fundamental law. Elbridge Gerry and James McHenry moved to prohibit the federal legislature from enacting bills
of attainder or ex post facto laws. The first part of the motion,
prohibiting bills of attainder, was agreed to without debate or dissent. 133 Since bills of attainder were common at that time,134 the
delegates probably viewed the clause as effectively altering the status quo; rather than declaring a natural right, the clause enacted a
positive right.
The debate over the ex post facto portion of the motion, however, reveals interesting assumptions regarding natural rights. All
the delegates who spoke explicitly or implicitly regarded an ex post
facto law as a violation of natural law, and most of them therefore
thought it unnecessary to include such a basic natural law principle in the written constitution:
Mr. GOV'R MORRIS thought the precaution as to ex post
fact laws unnecessary; but essential as to bills of attainder.
Mr. ELSEWORTH contended that there was no lawyer, no
civilian who would not say that ex post facto laws are void of
themselves. It can not then be necessary to prohibit them.
Mr. WILSON was against inserting any thing in the Constitution as to ex post facto laws. It will bring reflexions on the
Constitution-and proclaim that we are ignorant of the first
principles of Legislation, or are constituting a Government
which will be so ....
Doc'r JOHNSON thought the clause unnecessary, and imply'a'

Madison's Notes at 510-511 (Aug. 22).
See, e.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800).
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ing an improper suspicion of the National Legislature. 135
Those who defended the clause-and only three delegates did so,
one of whom Madison simply reported as being "in favor of the
clause"-did so on the ground that it might do some good, since
state legislatures had in fact enacted ex post facto laws, and the
existence of the clause might give judges something to "take hold
of." 13 6 They did not seem to deny that the clause was not strictly
necessary to make ex post facto laws void. There was thus an apparent consensus on this point, a conclusion further supported by
the fact that members of both the nationalist and anti-nationalist
factions spoke against the clause.
This exchange strongly suggests that the delegates, who by
this time understood that they were enacting fundamental law, did
not intend to enact positively all existing fundamental law, instead
relying on unwritten natural rights to supplement the enacted
Constitution. They apparently contemplated that laws not prohibited by the Constitution might still be invalid as contrary to natural law.137 This view is quite consistent with the contemporaneous
cases of judicial review discussed in Part I, and suggests that while
the framers may have discovered a new reason for a constitution's
status as fundamental law, they did not change its relationship to
131 Madison's
13

Notes at 510-511 (Aug. 22).

Id. at 511 (Aug. 22).

137 The perceived inherent flaw in ex post facto laws might have been a violation of
natural rights of the individual, or it might have been a violation of more general fundamental law such as the principles of "common right and reason." In either case, the argument in
the text indicates that some form of unwritten law could serve to invalidate even legislation
not prohibited by the written constitution.
Additionally, enacting ex post facto laws might have been seen as simply outside the
proper scope of legislative power. If viewed as extra-legislative, the question of ex post facto
laws might raise separation of powers principles, thus blurring the dichotomy suggested by
my analysis of both the pre-1787 state cases and the early Supreme Court cases. The other
evidence of the general existence and pervasiveness of that dichotomy, however, may indicate that the framers viewed ex post facto laws as a violation of individual rights rather than
as a violation of separation of powers principles, especially in light of the still amorphous
state of the notion of separation of powers. In other words, the dichotomy may shed light on
how to interpret the discussion on ex post facto laws. It is unsurprising, moreover, that a
distinction between individual rights and separation of powers should be blurry at the
edges, since the purpose of the latter was largely to safeguard the former.
Considered by itself, the discussion regarding ex post facto laws might also be seen as
reflecting merely a disagreement concerning how to interpret the written document. Natural
rights may have the same place in construing the written Constitution as "good faith" and
trade usage have in construing contracts: they are not necessarily independent sources of
obligation but they provide a very strong guide to interpreting the document. This interpretation of the framers' view of natural law, however, does not fit well with the other evidence,
especially the judicial opinions, which quite clearly use natural law as an independent
source of law and not merely a lens through which to view the written Constitution.
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other sources of fundamental law. Written and unwritten sources
of fundamental law might still be of equal importance.
A discussion earlier in the summer can plausibly be read as
suggesting this same philosophy. In one of the interminable debates over whether to include the Supreme Court in a Council of
Revision with veto power over legislative enactments, several delegates contended that the Council of Revision was unwise and unnecessary, since the judges would be able, in their judicial capacity,
to pass on the constitutionality of the laws.
The responses to this argument reveal a very traditional vision
of what made a law unconstitutional. James Wilson noted that the
Council of Revision was necessary because "[1laws may be unjust,
may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet
may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing
to give them effect. ' 13' This language, which sounds so odd to
modern ears (how can a statute be just a little bit unconstitutional?), suggests a continuum of unconstitutionality coinciding
with a continuum of injustice, lack of wisdom, dangerousness, and
destructiveness. Whatever Wilson thought about the level of unconstitutionality necessary before judges could hold a statute invalid, it is clear that he thought a statute might be "unconstitutional" as a result of flaws other than just a conflict with the
written constitution. He seemed to be using "constitution" in its
older meaning, as including the entire body of fundamental law.1"9
Madison also seemed to suggest a relationship between injustice and unconstitutionality. He argued that the Council of Revision would be useful "as an additional check [against] a pursuit of
those unwise & unjust measures which constituted so great a portion of our calamities."1 0 Whether Madison agreed with Wilson
about the relationship between unconstitutionality and injustice
depends on what he thought the Council's check would be "additional" to. If he thought the check additional to judicial review,
'13 Madison's Notes at 337 (July 21).
"' Goebel reaches the opposite conclusion from Wilson's choice of language, contending

that Wilson's comments embodied a consensus that "judgment on the policy of the laws did
not inhere in this power [of judicial review]." Goebel, History at 238 (cited in note 3). If
Wilson had said that a statute might be unwise (etc.) but not unconstitutional, Goebel's
interpretation would be accurate. Wilson, however, stated that an unwise (etc.) statute
might not be unconstitutional enough to be invalid. What is the import when one says that
an item has characteristics A through D, never says it has any of characteristic E, but jumps
directly to the question whether it has a sufficient amount of characteristic E? Such a progression strongly suggests that the presence of at least some of the characteristic E is related
to the presence of characteristics A through D.
10 Madison's Notes at 337 (July 21).
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and thus that the Council would be invalidating statutes because
of their unconstitutionality, the link between unconstitutionality
and injustice is clear. If, on the other hand, he was merely referring
to the Council's role in his system of checks and balances generally, there is no necessary connection between unconstitutionality
and injustice. Since the entire discussion concerned judicial review
and the judges' role in keeping the country on a constitutional
course, it is more likely that he thought the check additional to
judicial review."4 Thus in both their judicial capacity and as members of the Council, Madison expected judges to determine the
constitutionality of statutes at least in part by looking to whether
they were just; this suggests again that laws consistent with the
written constitution but inconsistent with other sources of fundamental law might be held invalid.' 42
These two discussions indicate that at least some of the delegates to the Federal Convention did not view their task as reducing
to writing the entire body of fundamental law. Instead, they
drafted a Constitution they hoped would coexist with and complement other sources of fundamental law. This vision of the Constitution is even more clearly evident in the debates two years later in
141 The specific context of the statement does not help in uncovering its meaning, as
Madison seemed to be making a series of rather unrelated points, and the quoted portion of
his speech forms a separate sentence:
Mr. MADISON considered the object of the motion as of great importance to the meditated [mediated?] Constitution. It would be useful to the Judiciary departmt by giving
it an additional opportunity of defending itself agst Legislative encroachments; It
would be useful to the Executive, by inspiring additional confidence & firmness in exerting the revisionary power: It would be useful to the Legislature by the valuable assistance it would give in preserving a consistency, conciseness, perspecuity & technical
propriety in the laws, qualities peculiarly necessary; & yet shamefully wanting in our
republican Codes. It would moreover be useful to the Community at large as an additional check agst a pursuit of those unwise & unjust measures which constituted so
great a portion of our calamities. If any solid objection could be urged agst the motion,
it must be on the supposition that it tended to give too much strength either to the
Executive or Judiciary. He did not think there was the least ground for this apprehension. [He then gives reasons for lack of apprehension.]
Madison's Notes at 337-38 (July 21).
142 Mason may also have agreed with Wilson, both on the existence of a continuum of
unconstitutionality and on its correlation with injustice. Mason's statement is more oblique,
and can be read either way: "[The judges] could declare an unconstitutional law void. But
with regard to every law however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not come
plainly under this description, they would be under the necessity as Judges to give it a free
course." Madison's Notes at 341 (July 21). He might have meant to indicate that unjust laws
could not be invalidated unless they were also in plain conflict with the Constitution, or he
might have meant that laws might be unconstitutional but not plainly so, even if they were
unjust. Since he was supporting Wilson's motion, it is reasonable to suppose that he was
merely restating Wilson's own defense.

1987]

Founders' Unwritten Constitution

1161

the House of Representatives, when that body
considered the first
143
Constitution.
new
the
to
amendments
of
set
B. The Congress and Fundamental Law
The clamor for a written bill of rights in the federal Constitution began at the very end of the Federal Convention itself,'4 and
gathered sufficient momentum during the ratification debates that
five states submitted proposed amendments to the Constitution
along with their ratifications. 14 5 The Federalists had consistently
maintained that a federal bill of rights was unnecessary in a government of limited powers, and might in fact be dangerous because
it would furnish support for interpreting federal powers more
broadly. 1 46 They had also argued that the citizens of states lacking
written bills of rights were no less free than citizens of those states
that had them, and thus that the lack of a federal bill of rights was
unimportant. 1 47 However, when Rhode Island and North Carolina
refused to ratify, and Virginia and then New York submitted calls
for a second convention, the Federalists were forced to take seriously the demands for a bill of rights, and James Madison took on
48
the task of pushing a bill of rights through Congress.1
Madison faced two major obstacles. First, some of the Antifed' The debates over ratification of the new Constitution are essentially irrelevant to
this question. To the extent that the antifederalists were simply anti-nationalists, the primary issue was allocation of power between federal and state governments. The source of
limitations on either government was not particularly at issue. To the extent that they were
classical republicans, the antifederalists might be thought to reject individual rights in favor
of individual sacrifice for the good of the polity. See generally Donald S. Lutz, Popular
Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory in the Early State Constitutions 1-50,
201-212 (1980); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 462-552 (1975). Their repeated calls for a federal bill
of rights, however, belie that conclusion, and suggest that their fight with the federalists
turned on issues entirely apart from any dispute over the sources of fundamental rights.
1'44See, e.g., Madison's Notes at 486 (Aug. 20), 630 (Sept. 12), 640 (Sept. 14), 652 (Sept.
15)(cited in note 6).
I' See Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention at 274-98 (1966). For the text of
the various proposed amendments, see Schwartz, Bill of Rights at 679-80 (Massachusetts),
756-57 (South Carolina), 760-61 (New Hampshire), 842-45 (Virginia), 911-914 (New
York)(cited in note 28).
16 See, e.g., Madison's Notes at 640 (Sept. 14) (liberty of the press); Federalist 84
(Hamilton); James Wilson, An Address To a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia, 1787,
in Schwartz, Bill of Rights at 528, 528-29 (cited in note 28); Robert Allen Rutland, The
Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791 142 (1955).
'47 See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech to Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, in Schwartz,
Bill of Rights at 630, 631 (cited in note 28). Only seven states in fact had bills of rights.
14' Madison in fact announced his intention to bring the amendments before the House
one day before Virginia's call arrived and two days before New York's. Rutland, Birth of the
Bill of Rights at 198-99 (cited in note 146).
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eralists now opposed adding a bill of rights, hoping for a second
convention instead. 14 9 The House of Representatives thus spent
more time debating whether it had time to consider his amendconsidering them,
ments, and on the best procedural formula 5for
0
than it did on the amendments themselves.1
Second, and more important, some of the original opponents
of a bill of rights-including Madison himself-had based their objections partly on the impossibility of enumerating all the rights of
mankind. A limited enumeration, they argued, would inaccurately
imply that the rights themselves were limited to those enumerated.
James Wilson argued against a bill of rights on this ground before
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
In all societies, there are many powers and rights which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a
constitution is an enumeration of the powers reserved. If we
attempt an enumeration, every thing that is not enumerated
is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale
of the government, and the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.'
James Iredell used the same argument-unsuccessfully, as it
turned out-in the North Carolina ratifying convention:
,9 Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 34 (1957); Rossiter, Grand Convention at 304 (cited in note 145); Rutland, Birth of the Bill of Rights at
199-200 (cited in note 146).
1,o See 1 Annals of Cong. 441-448 [424-43'11, 460-466 [442-449] (June 8, 1789), 686-691
[660-665] (July 21, 1789), 732-746 [705-719] (Aug. 13-14, 1789). Two printings of the first
two volumes of the Annals of Congress exist. They are identical except for pagination, running page titles, and back titles. The printing with the running page title "History of Congress" conforms to the remaining volumes of the series while the printing with the running
page title "Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in Congress" is unique. Checklist of United
States Public Documents 1789-1909 1463 (3d ed. 1911). The initial citations in this article
are to the "Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in Congress" version; the citations in brackets are to the "History of Congress" version.
It has also recently been shown that the Annals of Congress may not be a particularly
accurate account of debates in the House. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex.L.Rev. 1, 35-39 (1986). The
Annals are, however, the only extant report of the debates; to the extent that the intent of
those who drafted the Bill of Rights should guide moderninterpretation of the amendments, the Annals are still the most important source of information on that intent.
1'1 Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787 436 (1836) (October 28, 1787) ("Elliot's Debates"). Wilson had evidenced his
belief in natural rights as early as 1770, when he authored a pamphlet (published in 1774)
on the subject. See Wright, American Interpretations at 84-85 (cited in note 13).
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[I]t would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a
number of rights which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the stongest manner, that every
right not included in the exception might be impaired by the
government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to
enumerate every one. Let any one make what collection or
enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately mention
twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it. '15
Madison made the same argument to the Virginia ratifying convention, suggesting that a declaration of rights would be "dangerous, because an enumeration which is not complete is not safe."' 153
He noted the objection again when he introduced his proposed
amendments to the House of Representatives:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow, by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure.154
Madison agreed that this was "one of the most plausible arguments [he had] ever heard against the admission of a bill of rights
'' 55
into this system. 1

As Madison noted, the enumeration of rights might imply that
4 Elliot's Debates at 167 (July 29, 1788).
151 3 Elliot's Debates at 626 (June 24, 1788)(cited in note 151). The fear that an enumeration of rights would be construed to limit unenumerated rights is not the same as the
fear that it would be construed to grant unenumerated powers to the federal government.
See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup.Ct.Rev. 119, 151-54
(1965)(although Kelly mistakenly identifies Wilson as concerned only with the latter).
15, 1 Annals of Cong. at 456 [439] (June 8, 1789) (cited in note 150).
156 Id. He had also suggested the same thing somewhat more obliquely in 1788 in a
letter to Thomas Jefferson. He was concerned, he said, that "there is great reason to fear
that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained with
the requisite latitude." James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788, in Saul K.
Padover, ed., The Forging of American Federalism: Selected Writings of James Madison 253
(1953). His example-the limiting of religious tolerance-however, suggests that he was at
that time more worried about limited language of specific rights than the limiting effect of
enumerating rights. By 1789, he had apparently reached the broader conclusion as well.
Jefferson's response, interestingly, did not disagree with the basic premise, but maintained
that: "Half a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure
what we can." Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 15, 1789, in Life and Selected
Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 463 (cited in note 25). Nothing in Jefferson's outlook suggests that he felt the unsecured rights would be lost. Rather, he assumed that certain rights
would simply be better anchored than others.
162
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rights not enumerated were not protected. The House solved that
problem by including what became the ninth amendment: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.' 1 56 The
purpose of this language was quite clearly to avoid the negative
implication from an enumeration of rights. Madison's original language stressed that purpose:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.' 57
There was virtually no discussion of either Madison's original language or the Select Committee's draft. Gerry moved unsuccessfully
to substitute "deny or impair" for "deny or disparage," on the theory that "disparage" was "not of plain import," but was not seconded. 58 There was no further discussion of this amendment in either the House or the Senate.
The inherent rights of the people, moreover, were not thought
to be static. Edmund Pendleton suggested in 1788 that the "danger" of an enumeration of rights was that "in the progress of
things, [we may] discover some great and Important [right], which
we don't now think of.' 159 Wilson wrote in his law lectures:
It is the glorious destiny of man to be always progressive..
Hence we may infer, that the law of nature, though immutable in its principles, will be progressive in its operations and
effects.... In every period of his existence, the law, which the
divine wisdom has approved for man, will not only be fitted,
to the cotemporary [sic] degree but will be calculated to produce, in future, a still higher degree of perfection. 6 °
All of these men clearly thought that certain rights existed
whether or not they were declared. A number of influential men of
16

U.S.Const. amend. IX. The Select Committee's original language was virtually iden-

tical, differing only in speaking of rights enumerated in "this constitution" rather than "the
Constitution". 1 Annals of Cong. at 783 [754] (Aug. 17, 1789)(cited in note 150).
5
1 Annals of Cong. at 452 [435] (June 8, 1789)(cited in note 150).
Id. at 783 [754] (Aug. 17, 1789).
166 Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee, June 14, 1788, in David John Mays, ed.,
2 The Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1734-1803 532-33 (1967).
11 James DeWitt Andrews, ed., 1 Works of James Wilson 126-27 (1896).
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the founding generation thus envisioned a source of fundamental
rights beyond the written document, suggesting again that the
Constitution was not intended to reduce to writing all of fundamental law.
This recognition of the existence of fundamental rights not incorporated into the written document is also apparent in the debates in the House over Madison's proposed amendments. The
drafting committee itself proceeded on the principle that "these
rights belonged to the people; they conceived them to be inherent."1 6 ' This sentiment was echoed repeatedly, as various Representatives argued either that a particular clause, while stating an
indubitable truth, was unnecessary in the written constitution, or
that a clause should be excluded because it protected something
that was not a natural right. In a discussion about amending the
preamble to state that "Government being intended for the benefit
of the people, and the rightful establishment thereof being derived
from their authority alone,"'" 2 John Page of Virginia said that
"[h]e did not doubt the truth of the proposition brought forward
by the committee, but he doubted its necessity in this place.' 3 In
denying the necessity of the clause protecting freedom of assembly,
Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts stated that the right of assembly was "a self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be called in question."' 6 Egbert Benson of New York opposed a clause giving those
with religious scruples protection against being compelled to bear
arms, because, he said, the indulgence "may be a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the
discretion of the Government."' 6 5
The House simply did not see much need for particularized
enumeration of even the most unquestioned rights, because such
rights clearly existed whether or not they were enumerated.
Sedgwick ridiculed the possibility that a complete enumeration
might be made, suggesting that various unenumerated rights still
existed. He argued that had the committee proceeded on the principle of complete enumeration,
they might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of
rights; they might have declared that a man should have a
,s'1 Annals of Cong. at 759 [732] (Aug. 15, 1789)(cited in note 150).
162 Id. at 734 [707] (Aug. 13, 1789).
163 Id. at 746 [718] (Aug. 14, 1789).
"ll Id. at 759 [731] (Aug. 15, 1789).

,65Id. at 780 [751] (Aug. 17, 1789).
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right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when
he pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper; but he
would ask the gentleman whether he thought it necessary to
enter these trifles in a declaration of rights. 6
The House apparently viewed the Bill of Rights mainly as a public
relations device: the Representatives themselves recognized that
enumeration of rights made little or no difference to the legal efficacy of such rights, but wanted the people to be, as Elbridge Gerry
of Massachusetts put it, "secure in the peaceable enjoyment of
''
[their] privilege [s]. 167
The Representatives not only worried about what might be
left out of the enumeration, they also worried that the act of listing
might trivialize or limit even the enumerated rights. During the
discussion on freedom of assembly, Sedgwick made clear that implied rights might also exist:
[H]e feared [this amendment] would tend to make them appear trifling in the eyes of their constituents; what, said he,
shall we secure the freedom of speech, and think it necessary,
at the same time, to allow the right of assembling? If people
freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose;
*.. it is derogatory to the dignity of the House to descend to
such minutiae.'
Thus the Congress apparently viewed the Bill of Rights as neither
an exhaustive list nor a definitive description of the inherent rights
of mankind.
Consideration of the sparse legislative history of the ninth
amendment together with the debates over the rest of the Bill of
Rights, however, suggests two related conclusions. First, both the
ninth amendment itself and the debates over other amendments
confirm that the founding generation envisioned natural rights beyond those protected by the first eight amendments. Second, the
framers of the Bill of Rights did not expect the Constitution to be
read as the sole source of fundamental law. Both of these conclusions are consistent with the pre-1787 natural law tradition, and,
as the next section will show, both are consistent with early Su166

Id. at 759-60 [732] (Aug. 15, 1789).

Id.; see also id. at 444 [427] (Madison); 445 [428] (White); 446 [429] (Page); 448
[431] (Madison) (June 8, 1789); 760 [732] (Vining); 760 [732-33] (Hartley) (August 15,
1789); 786-87 [758-59] (Tucker) (August 18, 1789) (all urging passage of the amendments to
pacify constituents).
68 Id. at 759 [731] (Aug. 15, 1789).
'e
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preme Court interpretations of the Constitution.
C.

The Courts and Fundamental Law

Under a natural reading-even disregarding its natural law
heritage-the ninth amendment lends itself to a traditional inherent rights interpretation. It might, therefore, have been used by
judges interested in protecting inherent rights as a textual anchor
for their decisions. In fact, in Supreme Court decisions during the
first three decades after the adoption of the Constitution, most justices found some legislative enactments invalid by relying on natural law and related principles expressly, without resort to the mediating language of the ninth amendment. Although other scholars
have noticed what they often describe as isolated references to natural law, the "orthodox legal view" is that "there is no case in
which the courts have held an act invalid or refused to enforce a
law because regarded as contrary to natural law, except when such
69
a law was in conflict with an express constitutional provision.'
This section will suggest that it might be more appropriate to turn
this conventional wisdom on its head: there is no case during this
period in which the courts have upheld an act contrary to natural
law on the ground that the law was not in conflict with any constitutional provision.171
A careful examination of the first three decades of Supreme
Court constitutional jurisprudence suggests that the deeper pattern is consistent with the pattern observed in pre-1787 cases of
169 Haines, Revival at 75 (cited in note 13). Haines suggests, without much detail, that
natural rights played a somewhat larger role in early decisions. Id. at 86-94. For recent
scholarship taking the "orthodox" approach of denying the importance of natural law doctrines, see, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Power, 1801-1835, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 887, 892-94, 902 (1982)("Currie II"); David P.
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U.Chi.L.Rev. 819, 832-33
(1981) ("Currie I"). But see William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement
Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 513, 53032 (1974).
170 Modern constitutional doctrine, by contrast, frequently explicitly denies the Court's
right even to examine the potential injustice of a law unless there is an inconsistency with
the written Constitution. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986)("There
should be ...great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the due process] Clauses,
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without
express constitutional authority."); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
On Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 949 (1973)("A neutral and durable principle may be a
thing of beauty and a joy forever. But if it lacks connection with any value the Constitution
marks as special, it is not a Constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing
it.").
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judicial review. While individual Justices differed in the frequency
with which they cited principles of natural law, most of the Justices tended to rely on the written Constitution primarily in deciding allocation of power questions and on unwritten law in deciding
the rights of individuals.'
Chief Justice Marshall provides perhaps the best known example of early reliance on natural law. Even before he came to the
bench, he showed an unwillingness to confine the limits on the legislature to the written Constitution. In Ware v. Hylton,7 2 which
involved a complicated question of whether the Jay Treaty invalidated a Virginia statute confiscating property and thereby extinguishing a debt, Marshall argued the case for the defendant
debtor, seeking to uphold the Virginia statute. In arguing that Virginia had a right to confiscate the creditor's property, he naturally
contended that "[t]he legislative authority of any country can only
be restrained by its own municipal constitution."' 73 He refused,
however, to stop with this unequivocal rejection of natural law. He
suggested that legislative acts which "evidently ... violate any of

the laws of God" might be treated differently, but noted that since
"property is the creature of civil society," it was subject to civil
control.7 4 These combined contentions suggest that Marshall
17 William Nelson finds an analogous pattern in Chief Justice John Marshall's opinions: Nelson suggests that Marshall separated law from politics, resolving questions of law
by consensus and leaving politics to popular will. Nelson, 76 Mich.L.Rev. at 935-47 (cited in
note 133). Nelson's description of cases involving politics is similar to, although not perfectly congruent with, my identification of questions of allocation of power. See also Jennifer
Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Constitution, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 340 (1982)(noting a similar dichotomy)..
172 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). This is apparently the only case Marshall ever argued
before the Supreme Court. Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court In United States History
145 (1922).
173Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 211 (1796).
171 Id. Marshall's exclusion of certain property rights from the category of natural
rights is consistent with the eighteenth century pre-liberal vision of the relationship between the individual and the community, which changed for both Marshall and the country
over the next few decades. See Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694 (1985).
Marshall had earlier hinted at his adherence to principles of natural law. In defending
the proposed Constitution to the Virginia ratifying conventions (where he spoke only three
times), he began a lengthy rebuttal of the arguments of Henry and Mason by referring to
"the favorite maxims of democracy:" "A strict observance of justice and public faith, and a
steady adherence to virtue." 3 Elliot's Debates at 223 (June 10, 1788) (cited in note 151).
Since the Constitution he supported did not explicitly refer to any of these principles, and
since he did not tie together his introductory remarks and the substance of his refutation of
antifederalist sentiment, this rather oblique reference is somewhat hard to interpret. It is
plausible to read his comments as suggesting that the Constitution is consistent with principles of natural justice.
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viewed the case as an isolated question of federalism (whether the
United States could, by treaty, limit the actions of Virginia), without implicating any natural rights. Thus a written constitution is
the only limit on legislative power except where individual rights
are concerned; this approach is similar to the approach taken in
the pre-1787 state cases.
Marshall's early constitutional opinions also rely partly on
principles of natural law and partly on the written constitution.
Marbury v. Madison17 5 provides a perfect illustration of the differing weight accorded to the written constitution depending on the
nature of the question presented. In Marshall's own description,
the case raised three questions: whether Marbury had a right to his
commission, whether there was a remedy available to him, and
whether that remedy was a writ of mandamus issuing from the Supreme Court. The first question raised only common law and statutory issues relating to appointments, ministerial functions, and
the like, and Marshall unsurprisingly relied on common law and
statutory doctrines.
It is in Marshall's treatment of the second and third questions
in Marbury that the contrast between individual rights and allocation of power issues becomes most apparent. Marshall held, of
course, that for every violation of right there exists a legal remedy.
What is most interesting is that he supported this holding on only
two bases: fundamental principles of natural law and Blackstone's
Commentaries. He reasoned that legal remedies for violations of
rights are "the very essence of civil liberty" and that providing
such remedies is "[o]ne of the first duties of government.' 17 6 He

then confirmed this by a brief quotation from Blackstone to the
same effect.17 He made no mention of either the United States
Constitution or the Judiciary Act of 1789, two potential positive
sources of Marbury's right to a remedy. Individual rights, for Marshall, were derived not solely from positive enactments, but from
unwritten fundamental law.' 78 When he turned to the third question, however, to decide whether the legislature could impel the
judiciary to act in a particular manner, Marshall relied almost
solely on the written Constitution, using reason only as a means of
"15 U.S.
271

(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

Id. at 162-63.

Id. at 163.
M Contrast with this the modern doctrine that rights may often exist without remedies
if the legislature chooses not to provide a right of action. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
117
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elucidating the nature of a written constitution. Again, there is a
clear distinction between the Constitution as a blueprint for government and unwritten fundamental law as a guarantor of individual rights.
Two years later, Marshall also indicated an inclination toward
principles of natural law in a slightly different context in United
States v. Fisher.179 That case involved another question of individual rights: whether a federal statute should be construed to give
the United States priority over other creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding. The defendant creditor contended both that the statute did not contemplate such a result, and that if it did so it was
unconstitutional. The United States countered that the Court
could not declare the statute unconstitutional merely because of its
"inconvenience, inexpediency, or impolicy."' 80 Marshall ultimately
upheld that statute, interpreting it to confer priority on the United
States, by relying on the necessary and proper clause, without
much discussion. He did not respond to the arguments about inexpediency, since he found the statute expedient. In construing the
statute, however, he implicated natural law: He suggested that
"[w]here rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are
overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from,
the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistable clearness." 8 1 In this early version of the doctrine that statutes should
be construed so as to make them constitutional, then, Marshall apparently equated constitutionality with conformity to fundamental
principles.
For Marshall, as for the Court and the country, reliance on
natural law principles gradually gave way to a vision of the written
Constitution as the sole source of fundamental law.' 82 By 1810,
Marshall had begun the transition that would culminate in 1819 in
the Dartmouth College case. His opinion in Fletcher v. Peck'8 3 is
described by David Currie-an avowed skeptic of the role of natural law in Supreme Court decisions184-as "bristl[ing] with references suggesting unwritten limitations derived from natural

'1 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
180 Id. at 384.

,81Id. at 390. Marshall did not explain what should happen in the event that the legislature did clearly express its intent to violate such fundamental principles.
82 For general reviews of this transition and suggested causal factors, see, e.g., Haines,
Revival at 97 (cited in note 13); Wright, American Interpretations at 174-79 (cited in note
13); Nelson, 87 Harv.L.Rev. at 528-32 (cited in note 169).
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
"'
See note 169 (Currie takes "orthodox" view).
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law."'1 8 5 Marshall ultimately relied on some unfathomable combination of unwritten law and the written Constitution. While scholars might dispute which ground was of more dispositive relevance, 1 86 I would suggest that, in the context of earlier and later
cases, the presence of both types of argument signals a mind in
transition. A similar phenomenon is observable in McCulloch v.
Maryland;18 7 there the balance is more heavily weighted in favor of
textual constitutionalism" s8 as a result of the intervening nine
years since Fletcher v. Peck. 8 9 Even in 1819, however, Marshall in
McCulloch twice relied first on principles of general reasoning
before noting that the Constitution did not leave the conclusion to

115 Currie II at 892 (cited in note 169). For a full description of these references, see
id.
at 892-94.
186 Compare Currie II at 892-94 (cited in note 169), and Warren, 1 The Supreme Court

at 396 (cited in note 172) with Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Law § 8-1 (1978).
19717 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
I'l I am using the term "textual constitutionalist" to describe any judge who relies on
the written Constitution as the sole source of fundamental law, whatever method of interpretation is used to elucidate that most impenetrable document. The term thus encompasses most modern theories of constitutional interpretation. As Thomas Grey has suggested, the more interesting question is not whether or to what extent extra-textual sources
may be used to illuminate the written text, but rather whether such sources supplement the
written text. Grey, 37 Stan.L.Rev. 1 (cited in note 131). Both interpretivists and non-interpretivists (except for an occasional eccentric interpretivist) concede that extra-textual
sources are relevant to interpretation, and (except for an occasional eccentric non-interpretivist) that the written text is the sole source of fundamental law. They are therefore all
what Grey calls "constitutional textualists" and what I call "textual constitutionalists". I
have deliberately reversed the order of the two terms-"textual" and "constitutional"-to
emphasize that there are two types of constitutional or fundamental law: that derived from
the text alone (hence "textual constitutionalism"), and that derived from a multiplicity of
sources (which might be called "natural or extra-textual constitutionalism" if the term "natural law" did not already exist and serve). Grey calls those who favor the latter interpretation of fundamental law "supplementers:" those who insist that "tradition did not merely
interpret revelation but constituted part of it." Id. at 6.
189 A less well known Circuit Court opinion in 1815 shows a similar ambiguity. In
Meade v. Deputy Marshal, 16 Fed.Cases 1291 (C.C.D.Va. 1815), Marshall invalidated a sentence imposed by a Virginia court martial. He relied on three independent grounds: (1) in
the absence of Congressional delegation, courts martial are under federal, not state, control;
(2) even if properly under state control, the court martial acted improperly under Virginia
law; and (3) even if Congressional action had authorized the action (imposing a fine on a
private not actually in service) despite state law, the court had proceeded without notice.
The first two issues were purely statutory. As to the last, Marshall found:
It is a principle of natural justice, which the courts are never at liberty to dispense
with, unless under the mandate of positive law, that no person shall be condemned
unheard, or without the opportunity of being heard. There is no law authorizing courts
martial to proceed against any person, without notice. Consequently, such proceeding
is entirely unlawful.
Id. at 1293. This appears to be a movement away from the Cokean notion that natural law
supersedes positive law, and toward a more Blackstonian vision of legislative supremacy.
Natural law still plays a role, however, where positive law is silent.
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general reasoning, but instead contained a clause directly relevant
to the issue at hand.1 90 By later that term, in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 9 1 all traces of references to natural law had disappeared from Marshall's opinion, despite Daniel
Webster's eloquent defense of fundamental rights at oral
argument.1 92
Marshall, because of his long tenure, best illustrates the transition from using multiple sources of fundamental law to the modern textual constitutionalists' use of the single, written source.
However, the same early reliance on unwritten fundamental law
(especially in cases involving individual rights) may be seen in the
opinions of other Justices. Justice Chase's justly celebrated opinion
in Calder v. Bull 9 ' contains numerous references to principles of
natural law. Chase ultimately upheld the statute challenged in Calder, which retroactively changed the effect of a will. The basis for
his decision is unclear but apparently rested on two independent
grounds, one natural and one textual constitutionalist: the statute
did not infringe plaintiff's vested rights, and a civil law, even if
retroactive, was not proscribed by the ex post facto clause of the
federal Constitution."9 ' Despite his rejection of the plaintiff's challenge, his opinion is replete with suggestions of natural rights limitations on legislatures, beyond the limits prescribed by the written
Constitution. He stated that he "[could not] subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it is absolute and without
control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained
by the constitution, or fundamental law of the state." '9 5 He maintained that there are "certain vital principles in our free republican
governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and
flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law."' 9' In language reminiscent of Coke, he concluded that "[a]n act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law),
190 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 405-06 (supremacy clause), 411-12 (necessary
and proper clause).
19

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

Id. at 558.
193 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Even Currie agrees that Chase probably asserted power
to invalidate laws inconsistent with natural justice. Currie I at 871-74 (cited in note 169).
Goebel, however, insists that the Calder opinion is simply an example of a "collateral inquiry" into "local and common law usage" necessary to the primary question of the "literal
meaning" of the Constitution. Goebel, History at 792 (cited in note 3).
194 Chase's opinion is open to different readings. See Currie I at 866-75 (cited in note
169).
I" Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. at 387-88.
192

196Id. at 388.
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contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot
be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority."' 97 Finally, Justice Iredell apparently interpreted Chase's opinion as imposing natural law as an unwritten limitation on the legislature, for
he wrote a concurring opinion denying the judicial enforceablity of
natural law, relying in part on Blackstone.'9 8
Interpreting Chase's opinion in Calder as within the pre-1787
tradition of judicial review is also consistent with his opinion in
Ware v. Hylton 9 9 two years earlier. As noted above, that case involved a question of whether Virginia had a right to confiscate the
property of a British subject, notwithstanding the Jay Treaty. In
first concluding that Virginia had a right to confiscate the property
in the absence of a treaty, Chase simply noted that the legislature
could enact any law "not... repugnant to the constitution or fundamental law. '2 00 It is not clear whether "the constitution or fundamental law" referred to the same or different things. More revealing is Chase's discussion of whether Virginia's confiscation
violated the law of nations, which, as seen earlier, is simply a version of natural law. Chase, like Hamilton in Rutgers v. Waddington, divided the law of nations into three categories: general,
conventional, and customary. Law of the latter two types rested on
consent (express consent in conventional law, tacit consent in customary law), and bound only consenting parties. The general law
of nations, however, was "universal, or established by the general
consent of mankind, and [bound] all nations. '2 '0 1 Thus in the context of elucidating the law of nations, a close cousin of the law of
nature, Chase recognized room for both written (or otherwise
agreed to) and unwritten paramount law. Again, Iredell took the
contrary position, suggesting that the legislature may pass any law
not inconsistent with the written constitution.0 2
In contrast to Calder and Ware, Chase's opinion in the con-

197Id.
I's Id. at 398-99. Iredell may have been less narrowly textual constitutionalist than his
opinion in Caldermay indicate at first blush. Perhaps he may have meant only that "natural justice" ought not be enforced since there is disagreement over its content, without implying that other unwritten limitations (those of custom, tradition, or unalienable rights) are
similarly unenforceable. Moreover, his position as expressed in his letter regarding Bayard
v. Singleton and in the North Carolina ratifying convention suggests that he had already
recognized the existence of extra-textual limits on legislatures. I am indebted to Jeff Powell
for suggesting the alternative interpretation of Iredell's language.
19 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
1o0 Id. at 223.
I'l Id. at 227.
'01 Id. at 266.
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temporaneous case of Hylton v. United States'" relies solely on a
careful exegesis of the language and purpose of the federal Constitution. Nevertheless, Hylton adheres to the pre-1787 pattern: unlike Calder and Ware, Hylton raised only a question of federalism.
Whether the United States could tax carriages without apportioning the tax among the states was certainly of more interest to the
state of Virginia than it was to Daniel Hylton; in fact the latter
dropped out of the case (which was probably collusive) before it
reached the Supreme Court, Virginia took it over, and the United
States paid the legal fees. 0 4
Even more insistently than Chase or Marshall, Justices Johnson and Paterson wrote opinions resting squarely on extra-textual
grounds. In Ware, Paterson spoke of nations confiscating property
in time of war as "incompatible with the principles of justice and
policy" and "the dictates of the moral sense," "right reason and
natural equity". 5 In Calder, Paterson essentially agreed with
Chase, but added that since "[t]he constitution of Connecticut is
made up of usages" the way to determine the statute's constitutionality was to look to past practices.2 0 6 This, too, is consistent
with the English tradition of identifying the contents of a constitution by factual inquiry into legal norms. Johnson, who was not appointed to the bench until 1804, well after Calder and Ware, wrote
separate, natural law concurrences in both Fletcher v. Peck and
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. °7 In Fletcher, he relied on "a general
principle, on the reason and nature of things: a principle which will
impose laws even on the deity."2 He stated, moreover, that he
had written a separate opinion specifically in order to "have it distinctly understood, that [his] opinion on this point is not founded
on the provision in the constitution of the United States, relative
to laws impairing the obligation of contracts. ' 20 9 In Hunter's
Lessee, where Justice Story looked only to the written Constitution
to answer the federalism question of whether United States Supreme Court decisions were valid and binding against Virginia
courts, Johnson also concurred, mostly to take an even stronger
nationalist position than did Story. In the course of his concur203 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
20 See Suzanna Sherry, Perspectives: Law in the Grand Manner, 2 Const.Comm. 9

(1984).
201

Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 255.

208

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. at 395.
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
10 U.S. at 143.

2*8

Id. at 144.

201
207
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rence, however, he defined the federal Constitution as a contract
between the people, the states and the United States; this again is
consistent with older traditions.
Even Justice Story, who was appointed in 1811 and perhaps
came to represent best the textual constitutionalist strand of the
first half of the nineteenth century,21 0 originally envisioned natural
law limits to legislative authority. In Terrett v. Taylor, in 1815,
Story invalidated a Virginia attempt to revoke legislatively an earlier legislative grant of land to the plaintiffs. Throughout his opinion, Story referred indiscriminately to the federal and state constitutions, to "public principles,121

2

to "the common law,"21

3

to "the

common sense of mankind and the maxims of eternal justice,"21' to
"a great and fundamental principle of a republican government" 5
and to "the principles of civil right.

'216

He concluded by declaring

that the decision invalidating the statute "[stood] upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free
government, upon the spirit and the letter of the constitution of
the United States, and upon the decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals.

' 21

7

This resort to multiple sources of fundamental

law is almost identical to the technique of judicial review used in
Trevett v. Weeden almost thirty years earlier.
From 1789 until almost 1820, then, the Supreme Court continued the traditions of Bolingbroke and the early state courts: looking to natural justice as well as to written constitutions.2 1 s All of

the influential or significant Supreme Court Justices, except Iredell, wrote opinions that contained at least some references to extra-textual principles, not merely as a method of interpreting the
written constitution itself, but in order to judge the legality of the
210 See, e.g., R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the

Old Republic 191-92 (1985); H. Jefferson Powell, Book Review, 94 Yale L.J. 1285, 1307-14
(1985). See also Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
388-89 (1833) ("Nothing but the text itself was adopted by the people").
211 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
212 Id. at 50.
213 Id.
214 Id.
216

Id. at 50-51.

2I Id. at 51.
217

Id. at 52. Currie concludes that Story's reliance on extra-constitutional principles

was "at most. ... an alternative holding" to the primary constitutional holding; he then
chastises Story for not giving any reasons for holding the statute unconstitutional. Currie II
at 902-03 (cited in note 169).
221 An interesting variant on this practice is also found in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1793), where several Justices cited the preamble to the Constitution as authoritative fundamental law.
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challenged statute or other governmental action.2 1 As in the pre1787 state cases, references to principles of natural law are more
frequently found in cases involving individual rights, and a careful
examination of the written constitution is more often found in
cases involving allocation of powers.2 20
By approximately 1820, however, the reliance on natural law
was waning, disappearing entirely within a few years. It is this
nineteenth century rejection of the notions of natural rights that
has most influenced modern constitutional law. After two brief flirtations with decisionmaking on the basis of natural law,22 ' the Supreme Court since 1937 has made a consistent and at least partially successful attempt to link all of its decisions to specific
clauses of the Constitution, even when doing so stretches the language to the limits of credibility.
CONCLUSION

The formal analysis of modern constitutional law is pervaded
by the legacy of legal positivism, which has all but eradicated notions of any link between constitutional law and natural law.222
The Supreme Court is careful to ground every constitutional decision on the written Constitution, at whatever cost. Especially in
the cases furthest from the constitutional language, this tacit preference for textual constitutionalism over natural law concepts undermines the Court's decision by allowing critics to attack the decision using the Court's own criteria of decision making.2 23
219 Justices Wilson and Jay both wrote natural law opinions in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Cushing and Blair, both minor figures, seemed textual constitutionalist, to the extent that any characterization can be made of them, but neither wrote
much. See Chisolm, 2 U.S. at 450-453, 466-469; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 282-84; Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. at 400. John Rutledge (1789-1791; 1795); Thomas Johnson (1791-93), Oliver
Ellsworth (1796-1800), Alfred Moore (1799-1804), Henry Brockholst Livingston (1806-1823),
Thomas Todd (1807-1826) and Gabriel Duvall (1811-1835) did not write opinions in any of
the pre-1820 judicial review cases. Bushrod Washington (1798-1829) wrote a textual constitutionalist opinion in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), but did not write
opinions in any of the earlier judicial review cases.
220 State courts also continued to rely on unwritten fundamental law. See Bryant
Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Limits, 5 Tex.L.Rev. 231, 237 (1927).
221 The first return to a natural law approach came before the Civil War. See generally
Haines, Revival at 97-101 (cited in note 13); Nelson, 87 Harv.L.Rev. at 514-523, 528, 532
(cited in note 169); Farber and Muench, 1 Const.Comm. at 235 (cited in note 13). The second occurred during the Lochner era, approximately the first third of the twentieth century.
222 See Murphy, Art at 138-39 (cited in note 13).
223 The modern case perhaps most subject to criticism as lacking a constitutional foundation is probably Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g., Ely, 82 Yale L.J. at 920 (cited
in note 170); Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup.Ct.Rev. 159.
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A careful examination of the historical context of the Constitution, however, suggests that it was never intended to displace
natural law; the modern Court's insistence on textual constitutionalism as the sole technique of judicial review is thus inconsistent
with the intent of the founding generation. The founding generation-from a few years before the Revolution to almost thirty
years after the creation of the new government-instead expected
the judiciary to keep legislatures from transgressing the natural
rights of mankind, whether or not those rights found their way into
the written Constitution.

